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Executive Summary
Adapting through Crisis
Lessons from ACHAP’s Contributions to the Fight against HIV/
AIDS in Botswana
Overview
In 2000, Botswana was a country in crisis. The HIV/AIDS epidemic was ravaging the country, with 
an adult prevalence rate over 28 percent. Projections from the World Health Organization (WHO) 
indicated that 85 percent of 15 year-olds in the country would eventually die of AIDS. At the United 
Nations, President Festus Mogae commented, “We are threatened with extinction. People are dying 
in chillingly high numbers. It is a crisis of the first magnitude.”1
In response to this crisis, Merck & Co., Inc., the Merck Foundation, the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation (the Gates Foundation), and the Government of Botswana created the first public-
private partnership to tackle the HIV epidemic at a national scale in sub-Saharan Africa. The African 
Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnerships (ACHAP) was formed in 2000, with substantial financial 
resources (US$138.9M in total funding from the Merck and Gates Foundations), and large volumes 
of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) donated by Merck. ACHAP was a pioneer in scaling treatment, working 
with the government to achieve the first widespread HIV treatment coverage on the continent, and 
influencing the formation of key global partnerships such as the US President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). ACHAP also helped strengthen the public health system in Botswana, and 
contributed to reducing the rate of new infections in the country.
1 Maggie Farley, “At AIDS Disaster’s Epicenter, Botswana Is a Model of Action.” Los Angeles Times, June 27, 2001. 
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In late 2013, the Merck Foundation engaged FSG to conduct a strategic review of ACHAP, focusing 
on its successes, challenges, and lessons learned. This process is intended to document ACHAP’s 
impact during the last 15 years of support while also informing future strategy and decision-making 
for four key audiences:
1.  ACHAP’s leadership as it contemplates its next phase of work in Botswana and beyond,
2.  The Government of Botswana as it continues to manage the national response to HIV/AIDS in 
the country and also considers broader health needs,
3.  Merck and the Merck Foundation through the company’s business and corporate social 
engagement, and
4.  The global health community as it manages existing and future health challenges of a  
national scope.
A team of FSG consultants conducted research for this review between August 2013 and 
June 2014, with inputs including:
• Over 75 key informant interviews with current and former ACHAP leadership and staff, 
Government of Botswana officials, local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community 
based organizations (CBOs), international NGOs, donor agencies, and current and former 
representatives of the funders of ACHAP.
• Three trips to Botswana including meetings with key stakeholders in Gaborone and Francistown 
as well as field visits to other areas in the northeast of the country.
• Review of hundreds of documents pertaining to ACHAP’s strategy and operations, including prior 
evaluations of ACHAP’s first phase of work and of specific programs, board meeting materials, 
annual reports, published articles, and financial reports.
• Review of external literature assessing ACHAP, HIV in Botswana, key interventions, and other 
public-private partnerships.
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ACHAP’s activities occurred in a dynamic and changing environment for HIV/AIDS in Botswana, and its 
contributions to the response need to be assessed against this context.
As shown in Figure 1, the HIV epidemiology of the country changed substantially, from an urgent 
national crisis to a longer-term challenge. New funders and other actors emerged, such as PEPFAR. The 
Government of Botswana changed as well, with a new presidential administration taking office midway 
through the partnership. Finally, new science emerged over the course of the 15 years, with substantial 
advances in the world’s knowledge of both treatment and prevention of HIV. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of key changes in ACHAP’s context (2000 – 2014)
How Did ACHAP Perform in  
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Figure 1: Timeline of key changes in ACHAP’s context (2000 – 2014)
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For this reason, the story of ACHAP is one of adaptation. ACHAP’s contributions to the HIV response 
need to be assessed in the context of the changing environment; the key lessons from the public-
private partnership are around how the organization successfully adapted – or failed to adapt – as 
the epidemiological, political, HIV/AIDS knowledge, and stakeholder contexts changed.
Examples drawn from major program areas of focus demonstrate both successes and failures in  
how the partnership adapted its programmatic offerings based on the changing circumstances  
(see Figure 2).
ACHAP also adapted key characteristics as an organization – again, in some cases successfully, but in 
others failing to adapt. For example, the board was small and comprised primarily of representatives 
from its funders until 2011, when it expanded and incorporated representation from Botswana for the 
first time. The backgrounds of ACHAP’s senior leadership changed as well, initially emphasizing  
private sector, corporate experience, and then shifting to civil service backgrounds. The staff of  
ACHAP expanded substantially in the later years of the partnership, as the organization’s role  
changed from one of catalyzing government and strategic planning to direct implementation  
and program management.
Figure 2: Summary of ACHAP’s adaptation across four program examplesFigure 2: Summary of ACHAP’s adaptation across four program examples
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Overall, ACHAP made strong contributions to the HIV response in Botswana, and the country is a 
success story among Southern African countries. Examples of areas in which ACHAP contributed to 
impact include:
• Dramatic scale-up of antiretroviral therapy (ART) coverage: Botswana’s ART coverage 
rate is estimated at 85 percent of those in needi, which is among the highest rates in sub-
Saharan Africa. ACHAP worked with the government to build capacity and develop the initial 
infrastructure, forming the foundation for the national ARV treatment program. ACHAP also 
worked with the government to enact an opt-out HIV testing policy, which resulted in substantial 
increases in testing rates and in ART uptake.
• Reduction in HIV mortality: Deaths due to HIV per 100,000 population declined from 1,082 in 
2000 to 284 in 2012 as a result of the significant increase in ART coverage rates2.
• Strong success in the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT): ACHAP 
contributed to Botswana achieving a PMTCT coverage rate over 95 percent and a transmission 
rate of 3 percent – making it the only African country to have already achieved by 2013 the 
UNAIDS 2015 target of reducing the MTCT rate below 5 percent in breastfeeding populations3. 
ACHAP partnered with CDC and contributed financial and technical support to ensure the 
success of the PMTCT program in Botswana.
• Recent progress in scaling safe male circumcision (SMC), despite a slow start: As of 2013, 
24 percent of all 10 – 64 year old men were circumcised, more than double the rate in 20084. 
ACHAP implemented SMC programs directly and became the biggest contributor to national 
circumcision goals.
• Expanded impact by influencing program design of other funders: Botswana’s pioneering 
national ARV treatment program set an example for other programs in the region and informed 
the design of PEPFAR and the Global Fund5.
Achievements
i The Government of Botswana is currently conducting an audit of its estimates of the number of people in need of antiretroviral therapy. Preliminary 
output from this analysis has indicated a coverage rate of approximately 85 percent. This process will also result in revisions to historical coverage 
rates based on changes in the methodology for estimating need.
2 Calculation based on deaths data from UNAIDS 2013 Global Report and population data from World Bank DataBank.
3  “2013 Progress Report on the Global Plan Towards the Elimination of New HIV Infections Among Children by 2015 and Keeping Their Mothers 
Alive.” UNAIDS, June 30, 2013.
4  Botswana AIDS Impact Survey IV (BAIS IV) Summary, Statistics Botswana, 2013.
5  FSG interviews  
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In other areas where ACHAP played a role, either directly or through support to the government, the 
national response fell short. While not all of these areas of limited progress can be attributed directly 
to ACHAP, challenges include:
• Limited progress on averting new infections, especially in young women: Tracing the 
cohort of individuals aged 15 – 19 in 2004 finds that their prevalence rate tripled from 2004 to 
20136. Young women and girls are disproportionately affected, with prevalence rates among 25 
– 29 year old women at 27 percent compared to men at 13 percent7.
• Continued high rates of risk behaviors: Rate of adults with multiple partners in the last year 
increased from 11 percent in 2001 to 16 percent in 20138.
• Major concerns around tuberculosis co-infection: TB cure rates declined from 2009 to 
2011; ACHAP contributed to expanded treatment coverage, but limited adherence to protocols 
in the public health system has stymied results9.
• Remaining gaps in safe male circumcision: The Government of Botswana revised its national 
targets to 385,000 adolescents and men aged 13 – 49 in 2011, but Botswana is still behind 
targets and declining donor funds for SMC may further inhibit future progress10.
• Challenges with impact measurement and planning: Government estimates of the total 
ART need still lack reliability, and there are still concerns over the financing of the program in  
the future11.
Challenges
6 Botswana AIDS Impact Survey IV (BAIS IV) Summary, Statistics Botswana, 2013.
7  Botswana AIDS Impact Survey IV (BAIS IV) Summary, Statistics Botswana, 2013.
8  Botswana AIDS Impact Survey IV (BAIS IV) Summary, Statistics Botswana, 2013. 
9  2012 Botswana National TB Program Annual Report
10  FSG interviews
11  FSG interviews
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ACHAP formed at a time when many other public-private partnerships (PPPs) on health issues 
were emerging. Examining this landscape of partnerships, FSG identified five characteristics 
of successful PPPs (Figure 3), drawing from external literature on PPPs as well as a landscape 
assessment of other partnerships on HIV and other global health issues. ACHAP’s performance 
against these characteristics is mixed and nuanced. On characteristics such as adapting overall 
strategy and role, nurturing partnerships with government, and leveraging the power of the 
private sector, ACHAP provides both leading practices and areas for improvement. On investing in 
knowledge and planning for sustainability, ACHAP did not perform as strongly.
Figure 3: Five Characteristics of High-performing PPPs
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Public-Private Partnership?
Figure 2: Summary of ACHAP’s adaptation across four program examples
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Adapt Overall Strategy and Role
• ACHAP successfully shifted its programmatic approach to stay relevant to the epidemic as the 
context for its work changed. ACHAP shifted from working within government systems to a 
more independent approach focused on innovating and piloting new programs.
• However, even after the initial crisis, ACHAP did not have a strategic plan in place. As a result, 
ACHAP was not able to be fully intentional in its efforts to make this shift from catalyzing 
government to direct implementation, nor was it transparent to the other key partners.  
For example, while ACHAP’s initial flexibility was crucial in supporting the development of the 
first ARV treatment sites, once the treatment program was more established, ACHAP could have 
invested in the development of a strategic plan to support future growth and align  
internal resources.
Leverage the Power of the Private Sector
• ACHAP leveraged a nimble, independent group of managers with private sector skills to initially 
set up and scale the ARV treatment program. ACHAP shifted management and brought in new 
expertise and staff experience in an effort to transition to a more established organization. With 
this shift, ACHAP lost some of its private sector skill base, and did not adequately build in a 
performance management systems that would allow for regular performance assessment  
and review.
• ACHAP’s funders committed to supporting the partnership without specific expenditure 
restrictions during the initial five years of funding, giving ACHAP’s managers the flexibility  
to spend resources as needed and experiment with new programs that may take time to  
show results.
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Nurture Partnerships with Government
• ACHAP was intentional about putting systems and structures in place to support its ongoing 
relationship with the government, and ensure alignment and buy-in from key government 
stakeholders at the national and local levels. These structures included the Madikwe Forum, 
which brought ACHAP’s board and management together with the Permanent Secretaries 
from key ministries to align on strategy. ACHAP also seconded staff into ministries to ensure 
coordination at a tactical level.
• ACHAP was not as successful at maintaining high-level relationships with key government 
officials as government priorities shifted to other issues. ACHAP was established to support an 
ARV treatment program in concert with the government, and this model required significant 
engagement from the government to be successful. When the government’s interests shifted, 
ACHAP lost some of its influence with political leadership. ACHAP struggled to achieve a similar 
level of success in other programs (such as safe male circumcision) using an approach that 
required such deep engagement from government. While ACHAP did not have control over the 
government’s priorities, in developing new programs, ACHAP should have taken into greater 
consideration the extent to which it relied on the prerequisite of political will to implement  
its work.
Invest in Knowledge
• ACHAP was effective at using data to guide program-level tactical decisions. For example, when 
ACHAP was building the ARV treatment program, management quickly identified that low HIV 
testing rates were a barrier to increasing the number of patients on treatment. ACHAP supported the 
government to enact a national HIV testing opt-out policy which helped to drive up testing rates and 
facilitate expansion of treatment services.
• However, ACHAP consistently underinvested in its own management information systems to support 
broader learning and evaluation that would inform its overall strategy. ACHAP lacked adequate 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) staff to develop a robust process for measuring impact, limiting its 
ability to integrate lessons into annual planning and share information across geographies.
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• ACHAP also missed opportunities to invest in effective dissemination of its learnings. While the 
partnership published frequently in medical journals and put out robust communications pieces, it had a 
unique platform to conduct implementation research that would have been more practical and relevant 
to the field. ACHAP could have been more intentional in translating its academic contributions into 
practical insights for key global health audiences that would benefit from specific lessons in PPP design 
and management.
Plan for Sustainability
• ACHAP did set many of its program activities on a path toward sustainability by positioning programs 
to be transferred to the government or by engaging other implementing partners to provide support. 
However, there is still a lack of clarity as to how elements of ACHAP’s successful programs will be 
sustained in the future: for example, in how the government will fund aspects of the ARV treatment 
program beyond the conclusion of ARV donations that support a part of the national ARV supply, and 
in the pace of public sector implementation of SMC.
• ACHAP and its funders were not effective in planning for the long-term sustainability of the 
organization. For example, despite the decrease in available funding following the departure of 
the Gates Foundation in 2012, ACHAP did not lay out a plan for longer-term funding support until 
2013. Regardless of the intended direction (sunsetting or continuing to catalyze new areas in the HIV 
response), the partnership needed more concerted planning around goals for impact, accompanying 
milestones, and resource implications of these goals upfront to ensure that there would be resources 
available.
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What Can Other 
Public-Private Partnerships  
Learn from ACHAP?
Partnerships looking to maintain relevance and impact 
in a dynamic context need to adapt at strategic, 
organizational, and programmatic levels. Several 
attributes can lay a foundation for public-private 
partnerships to adapt successfully:
a.  Emphasize nimble execution: Hire staff and 
management that take initiative, are results-driven, 
and move at a rapid pace to help the partnership 
to be reactive to the changing context. At the same 
time, be sure to identify opportunities to embed the 
private sector skills in government processes and 
culture.
b.  Leverage flexible funding: In the beginning, 
partnerships should prioritize a flexible funding 
structure to allow management to establish 
programs and test new practices in order to 
Emphasize adaptation as a core 
characteristic for successful public-
private partnerships: 
Based on the successes and 
challenges during ACHAP’s  
15 years of partnership, there  
are six key lessons that other 
public-private partnerships should 
incorporate into their work.
1
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Be intentional about strategic 
shifts and set a clear upfront 
strategy and milestones:
To encourage entrepreneurial activity and innovation, 
partnerships can allow for flexibility early on. However, 
all activities should be tied to clear goals and, once 
the initial programs are established, the partnership 
should create an explicit strategic plan with milestones 
and systems for measuring progress. The plan should 
assess the internal staff expertise and capabilities 
to evaluate if the partnership can execute on the 
plan, and identify any additional skills needed. The 
milestones can also prompt decision points for the 
partnership to assess whether or not to continue 
funding individual programs. Partnerships should also 
focus on building strategic relationships that will help 
with execution against the plan.
2
identify the appropriate path for reaching the 
partnership’s goal. Once these visions and 
strategies are established, partnerships can shift 
to alternate funding structures that tie short-
term results more closely to future funding 
decisions.
c.  Embed learning mechanisms early: Build 
relationships and take time to incorporate 
new data into planning early and often to 
identify new science, emerging partnership 
opportunities, and changing needs.
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Plan for sustainability and ensure there 
is ongoing communication between 
members of the partnership at the 
execution and leadership levels: 
It is critical that partners begin with the end in mind: 
to ensure that progress will be sustained, they need to 
plan for the sustainability of programs upfront during 
the program design phase, and discuss potential 
exit strategies for the organization’s initial funders. 
There is a need for partners engaged in the initiative 
to communicate about the partnership strategy and 
ensure alignment on program goals. In addition, 
partners should communicate at the leadership level 
to ensure the strategic directions of the participating 
organizations also align.
4
Design the appropriate 
governance and management 
structure:
Public-private partnerships should assess the 
expertise and guidance needed to execute the 
chosen strategy. For example, organizations can 
select a management team with private sector 
expertise and balance this with public sector 
or content expertise on the board. Alternately, 
partnerships can place funders on the board to 
maintain close relationships between the funders 
and the grantee. Either way, the partnership should 
be clear about the implications of the governance 
and management structures that it creates to 
anticipate opportunities or challenges.
3
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Develop capabilities in learning and 
evaluation as well as implementation:
Public-private partnerships need a mix of internal 
capacity development and external support 
in order to strengthen their abilities to collect 
and interpret data in a useful way and inform 
their own organizational planning as well as for 
the broader field. Partnerships also need to be 
intentional about their plans for disseminating 
best practices to the field by emphasizing relevant 
implementation research that responds to needs 
of other program managers, and by using diverse 
venues and practical formats beyond annual 
reports and academic publications.
5
Align the degree of government 
collaboration with the partnership 
objectives and build appropriate 
structures for coordination:
Partnerships need to design appropriate collaboration 
mechanisms that allow for alignment with government 
in order for partners to effectively execute and scale 
programs. How these collaboration mechanisms operate 
more specifically will depend on the partnership’s 
objectives, resources available, government capabilities, 
and support needed to achieve the goals. There is 
a range of structures for collaboration: partners can 
engage with government by infusing private resources 
directly into government budgets, by forming hybrid 
collaborations such as ACHAP, or by launching private 
sector-led efforts that operate with light oversight from 
and coordination with government. Some may require 
less intensive relationships with a lighter coordinating 
forum while others may require a deeper collaboration 
with support across all levels of government.
6
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ACHAP broke new ground in proving the feasibility 
of HIV treatment in sub-Saharan Africa. The successes 
of Botswana emboldened the global AIDS response, 
shifting the dialogue to emphasize aggressive targets 
for treatment scale-up. The partnership provides 
crucial lessons for other public-private initiatives, 
particularly in how it was able to adapt its strategy 
and role beyond the initial mandate, and in its early 
structures for engaging government. However, ACHAP 
also offers several cautionary tales for other public-
private partnerships. It underinvested in learning and 
evaluation, insufficiently navigated the changing 
political context in Botswana, and belatedly planned 
for the sustainability of the partnership.  
Conclusion
Going forward, there are tremendous opportunities for 
ACHAP and other partnerships to take these lessons 
into new arenas: for example, in the mainstreaming 
of HIV/AIDS services into the broader public health 
system, and in the response to the emerging burden 
of non-communicable disease in low- and middle-
income countries. Hopefully, these future efforts will 
retain and strengthen the adaptive nature that ACHAP 
has displayed over its 15 years of impact on HIV/AIDS 
in Botswana.
Background of This Review 
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Background of This Review 
Merck Foundation engaged FSG, a nonprofit consulting and research firm, to conduct a strategic review 
of the African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnerships (ACHAP), focusing on the successes, challenges, 
impact, and lessons learned by the partnership over its 14 year history. This evaluation is intended to 
document ACHAP’s impact while also informing future decision making within Merck, among other key 
actors in global health, and for ACHAP’s leadership as they plan the organization’s next phase of work in 
Botswana and beyond.  
A team of FSG consultants conducted research for this review between August 2013 and June 2014, with 
inputs including: 
 Over 75 key informant interviews
ii with current and former ACHAP leadership and staff, 
Government of Botswana officials, local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community 
based organizations (CBOs), international NGOs, donor agencies, and current and former 
representatives of the funders of ACHAP. 
 Three trips to Botswana including meetings with key stakeholders in Gaborone and Francistown 
as well as field visits to other areas in the northeast of the country. 
 Review of hundreds of documents pertaining to ACHAP’s strategy and operations, including prior 
evaluations of ACHAP’s first phase of work and of specific programs, board meeting materials, 
annual reports, published articles, and financial reports. 
 Review of external literature assessing ACHAP, HIV in Botswana, key interventions, and other 
public-private partnerships. 
Collection of primary health outcomes data was not in the scope of this evaluation, but the report 
leverages recent data sources such as the Botswana HIV/AIDS Impact Survey IV (2013) and international 
sources such as UNAIDS AIDSINFO to present a detailed analysis of overall impact. This report attempts 
to use the most current data available as of June 2014.  
 
 
 
                                                     
ii See Appendix for list of key informant interviews 
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Context of the Epidemic 
In 2000, Botswana and its Southern African 
neighbors were in crisis. With one of the highest 
HIV prevalence rates in the region (over 28 
percent among adults), AIDS deaths were 
skyrocketing. Based on the trajectory of the 
disease at the time, the WHO estimated that 
average life expectancy would be reduced by 
over 30 years, and 85 percent of 15 year olds in 
the country would eventually die of AIDS
12
. 
Such dramatic declines in life expectancy 
threatened to reverse Botswana’s economic 
development gains over the previous four 
decades and cause major strains on health care 
systems and services in the region. With 
economic growth rates over 10 percent since 
the late 1960s, due in large part to the 
expansion of the mining industry, Botswana was 
in a stronger financial position to tackle the 
epidemic
13
, but the country’s low population 
density posed infrastructure challenges, 
particularly around health care delivery. 
In the late 1990s, advances in AIDS science led 
to highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) 
and demonstrated that longer, healthier lives 
with HIV were possible. However, as of 2000, 
the cost per patient was still over US$10,000 
per patient per year
14
 prohibiting most 
governments in Southern Africa from investing 
in nationwide treatment programs: all countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa had negligible coverage rates of ARV treatment in 2000
15
. Pharmaceutical 
companies took important steps to reduce costs and make ARVs more affordable. The Accelerating 
Access Initiative
iii
, launched in May 2000, was a collaboration between leading pharmaceutical companies 
which significantly reduced costs per patient but there was still a need to support African countries to 
adopt the discounted ARVs
16
. 
                                                     
iii The Accelerating Access Initiative was a partnership between leading pharmaceutical companies (Merck, GSK, Bristol-
Myers Squibb, Abbott and Boehringer-Ingelheim) and UNAIDS to explore opportunities for ARV price reductions. Johnson & 
Johnson, Pfizer, and Gilead later joined the initiative. UNICEF, the World Bank, UNFPA and the WHO also supported the 
initiative. 
Figure 4: Life expectancy and death rates from HIV in Southern Africa  
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Despite these advances, pharmaceutical companies continued to attract negative attention. Many in civil 
society were calling for pharmaceutical companies and governments to expand access to treatment in 
developing countries. Oxfam, Save the Children, and VSO released a statement in 2000 challenging the 
pharmaceutical industry to improve efforts to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the UN convened a 
special session on HIV/AIDS with the intent to increase political and social commitment to addressing the 
issue
17
. 
Despite the increasing burden of the epidemic, some major international institutions were skeptical of the 
feasibility of widespread scaling of treatment. In one infamous example in 2001, Andrew Natsios, the 
head of USAID, commented that adherence to ARV treatment in Africa was difficult because “many 
people in Africa have never seen a clock or a watch their entire lives” and would not know when to take 
the drugs
18
. The WHO was also initially resistant to prioritizing treatment, emphasizing the need for 
greater prevention services instead.  
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ACHAP's Formation 
Merck and the Gates Foundation were keen to demonstrate that a national treatment 
program was possible in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Government of Botswana was 
determined to find partners to introduce treatment at scale. 
In this setting, Merck & Co., Inc., the Merck Foundation, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation brought 
unique interests and assets to form an innovative public-private partnership to address the HIV/AIDS 
crisis in Botswana. Under the leadership of Raymond Gilmartin, CEO, and Per Wold-Olsen, lead for 
Merck’s business in Africa, Merck aimed to show that the private sector could play a constructive role in 
the AIDS response and contribute to the development of a comprehensive approach to addressing 
HIV/AIDS, including treatment. Merck recognized that the donation of ARVs alone would be insufficient, 
and sought to partner with government to build the infrastructure and facilities needed to deliver 
treatment. Merck approached the Gates Foundation in an effort to bring in additional expertise and 
financial resources to the effort. The Gates Foundation expressed interest in joining the partnership to 
demonstrate that, given the right circumstances (such as government stability and economic strength), 
treatment at scale was possible in sub-Saharan Africa and there was the potential to reverse the course 
of the disease
19
. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Timeline of key events in the AIDS response circa 2000 
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Merck had conducted smaller pilot treatment programs in Kenya, Cote D’Ivoire, and Cameroon, but never 
at a national level
20
. Likewise, the Gates Foundation had only supported smaller pilot programs and 
wanted to show that, despite the challenges in low resource settings, a national treatment program was 
feasible in sub-Saharan Africa. Other pharmaceutical companies had started HIV programs at the time, 
including Bristol-Myers Squibb with Secure the Future and Abbott Laboratories with efforts in Tanzania, 
but these focused on specific interventions or smaller geographic locations. Merck and the Gates 
Foundation aimed to create the first program of its kind by operating in partnership with the government 
and providing treatment and prevention at scale. The implicit goal was for this program to ultimately 
inform the approaches to HIV/AIDS in other sub-Saharan African countries. 
Botswana was chosen for the launch of the partnership based on political will, economic 
strength, and presence of health infrastructure.  
After assessing candidate country partners and the unique dynamics of the epidemic in each, Merck 
prioritized Botswana based on its many strong supporting factors – including level of government 
commitment, presence of basic health infrastructure, manageable size, and higher availability of 
resources compared to neighboring countries. They thought that the country offered a higher likelihood of 
success compared to larger options such as Uganda
21
. Furthermore, Merck had learned about the 
potential for impact through the Enhancing Care Initiative, a collaboration with the Harvard AIDS Institute 
led at Harvard by Dr. Richard Marlink and Dr. Daniel Tarantola. Some criticized the decision to focus on 
Botswana, stating that with a relatively high income and small population (1.7M in 2001
22
), it would not 
serve as a representative example for other countries in the region.  
The Harvard AIDS Institute, which had been active in Botswana for years, facilitated an introduction to 
President Festus Mogae and Minister of Health Joy Phumaphi, and, in 2000, the partners agreed to 
launch the African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnerships (ACHAP).  
ACHAP was established with a $100M commitment over five years, with the Merck Foundation and the 
Gates Foundation each contributing $50M. The organization was registered as a non-profit 501(c)3 in the 
United States, with Merck as its secretariat. In addition to contributing funds, Merck and the Gates 
Foundation placed representatives on the board to oversee the management of funds and program 
implementation. Merck also committed to supporting the treatment program through substantial donations 
of ARVs – initially, its drugs Crixivan and Stocrin, and later Atripla as a new first-line single-dose 
combination and Isentress as a second-line option. Merck also seconded Donald de Korte, a medical 
doctor and executive leading Merck’s South African affiliate, to lead ACHAP’s day-to-day operations as 
the organization’s first managing director. 
In October 2001, President Mogae declared in his State of the Nation address that HIV/AIDS was the 
most serious challenge facing Botswana and threatened the future existence of its people. This statement 
launched the beginning of the treatment program and showed the country’s commitment to fighting the 
epidemic. The treatment program, called Masa (“a new dawn” in Setswana), was initially launched in four 
sites. In the years that followed, treatment availability expanded to a progressively wider number of sites. 
In addition to providing ARV drug therapy, the government committed to strengthening the health sector 
to support the treatment program.  
ACHAP's Formation 
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ACHAP’s early years involved not only resource provision but substantial strategic and 
organizational adaptation.  
ACHAP was launched with the expectation that the government would have a plan prepared for scaling 
treatment and prevention and that Merck and the Gates Foundation would simply provide the resources. 
However, when ACHAP began in 2000, there were significant infrastructure challenges that would need 
to be overcome, and a national strategic plan for the program was still under development.  
In the years that followed, ACHAP worked side by side with the Government of Botswana, primarily 
through the National AIDS Coordinating Agency 
(NACA), the Ministry of Health (MOH), the Ministry of 
Local Government, and the Ministry of Finance & 
Development Planning. The partnership supported 
national strategic planning processes, infused 
resources to overcome barriers in the treatment 
program, and involved itself in prevention and care 
activities through the government and through local 
community-based organizations (CBOs).  
 
  
There were several characteristics that were essential 
to ACHAP’s approach. Throughout its history, it has 
maintained a public-private partnership structure, and 
brought a combination of private sector acumen and 
enabled the government to make durable progress at 
Figure 6: ACHAP's phases of organizational adaptation 
“Back in 2000, it took courage to put together a program 
that had the intent to scale. This deserves to be applauded: 
the approach was unprecedented and ACHAP had to 
work from scratch to find its path.” 
- Ambassador Eric Goosby, Former United States 
Global AIDS Coordinator  
 
 
“Our initial staffing allowed us to take advantage of 
government scale, but also use private sector know-
how to move fast.”  
- Dr. Ernest Darkoh, Former ACHAP 
ACHAP's Formation 
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scale. While those characteristics remained at the core of the organization’s structure, ACHAP adapted in 
new ways over the course of the partnership, as shown in Figure 6. In the early days, a small team led by 
managers with private sector backgrounds launched ACHAP. The board of directors was small and 
consisted primarily of representatives from ACHAP’s two funders
iv
. In the next phase, the organization 
became less centralized and saw its leadership change. The middle years (2009-2010) were focused on 
planning, and set the stage for more dramatic changes ahead. During 2011, the board expanded by 
bringing more substantive Batswana representation. As of 2014, the organization has a new CEO, has 
decreased annual spending, and is focused on codifying its gains and planning for the future.  
Merck and the Gates Foundation decided to place representatives on ACHAP’s board to guide the 
strategic direction of the organization and manage the flow of funds. This created a dual role for Merck 
and the Gates Foundation as both leaders and funders of ACHAP. In the early years, this structure 
allowed ACHAP to have access to flexible funds, adapt easily to shifting contextual needs, and take 
advantage of funder management skills. As the external context changed and ACHAP adapted its 
approach and programs, the dual role of the funders created some challenges and complications for the 
organization.  
 
 
 
                                                     
iv See Figure 21 in the Appendix for a full timeline of ACHAP’s board of directors 
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The Changing Context of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Botswana 
The story of ACHAP is one of adaptation. ACHAP’s contributions to the HIV response need to be 
assessed in the context of the changing environment. As shown in Figure 7, the context of ACHAP’s work 
changed substantially along several dimensions, The key lessons from the partnership are around how 
the organization successfully adapted – or failed to adapt – as the context changed.  
 
Figure 7: Timeline of key context changes 
 
From an epidemiological standpoint, the reduction in mortality and somewhat lower rates of new 
infections meant that the AIDS response moved from crisis mode to planning for durable support and 
care – and this brought new challenges as the sense of urgency around HIV decreased. In terms of 
funding, few other entities were able to provide a comparable amount of resources to address the 
HIV/AIDS crisis in Botswana in 2000, but in the years that followed, important new players emerged. CDC 
and the Harvard AIDS Institute had both been conducting research and providing support in Botswana 
prior to ACHAP’s formation, but its resources were small compared to the $100 million donated by the 
Merck Foundation and the Gates Foundation in the first 5 years. In later years, other funders emerged: in 
2004, PEPFAR entered Botswana and provided $650M over ten years to address HIV/AIDS, significantly 
shifting the funding landscape
23
. As a result, ACHAP’s current support is a small portion of overall AIDS 
funding. As shown in Figure 8, Botswana today still sees high international AIDS funding per capita, 
though its share of domestic funding is also substantially higher than its neighbors.  
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The Government of Botswana 
also changed leadership and 
expanded its focus, 
prioritizing broader economic 
development and poverty 
alleviation in addition to the 
HIV response. President 
Mogae played an important 
role in the launch and uptake 
of the HIV/AIDS treatment 
program in Botswana. His 
outspoken public commitment 
in support of the treatment 
program, including personally 
chairing the National AIDS 
Council and being one of the 
first African heads of state to 
take a public HIV test
24
, helped to align government ministries and other actors. This commitment was 
especially important in addressing the significant issues of stigma in the country. As the treatment 
program scaled, population health improved, and a new administration took office, the government 
broadened its focus. The Government of Botswana continued to contribute significantly to HIV 
programming, with net spending at $219M in 2012, which is roughly 70% of overall financing for HIV 
programs in Botswana
25
. While HIV/AIDS remains a key priority, issues such as health systems 
strengthening and poverty alleviation have been areas of greater focus for the government.  
The world’s knowledge of how to prevent and treat HIV also evolved between 2000 and 2014. Studies 
confirming the effectiveness of male circumcision as an HIV prevention intervention emerged in 2005-
2006,
26
 and others published in 2011 showed that the use of ARV treatment to suppress viral load in HIV-
positive individuals substantially reduces the risk of transmission. There were also changes in 
understanding the effectiveness of some behavior change interventions, with a major literature review 
finding few examples of success in behavior change programs related to HIV
27
. 
Together, these changes meant that ACHAP and its partners had to reinvent the organization’s purpose, 
programs, and structures multiple times over the course of the partnership’s 15 years. The sections that 
follow examine ACHAP’s overall contributions to impact and its areas of failure, how ACHAP adapted its 
programmatic work in response to this changing context, as well as how effectively it performed as a 
public-private partnership.  
 
 
 
Figure 8: Comparison of HIV funding across countries 
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Achievements and Challenges in the Botswanan AIDS Response 
ACHAP’s achievements need to be understood in the context of Botswana’s overall response to the 
epidemic. While ACHAP played a central role in the country’s fight against AIDS, its contributions came in 
the context of a larger ecosystem of players.  
Achievements 
Botswana alleviated the crisis through its rapid scale-up of antiretroviral treatment.  
As of January 2014, the country had 231,163 people on HAART
28
, covering over 85 percent of the 
projected need in the country
v
. Beyond its achievements in terms of scale, the ARV treatment program in 
Botswana has demonstrated impressive results in reducing mortality. A longitudinal study examining ARV 
treatment in Botswana from 2002 to 2010 found an 
overall mortality rate of 2.7 deaths per 100 person-
years. The Futures Institute has also conducted an 
assessment of the epidemiological, economic, and 
social impact of ACHAP’s support and investment in 
HIV/AIDS in Botswana and the results of that study 
are set to be released in the fall of 2014. Putting 
these rates in context, the study notes that 
Botswana’s mortality rates are comparable to Rwanda’s and substantially lower than in Zambia (16.1 
deaths per 100 person-years)
29
.  
This success rippled far beyond Botswana’s borders. 
The country served as the first major proof of concept that scaling HIV treatment in a heavily affected 
African country was feasible. Delegations from other nations around Southern Africa and Latin America 
visited Botswana to observe the partnership to inform their own national treatment programs. As 
treatment was first introduced, Stephen Lewis, the Special UN Envoy on HIV/AIDS in Africa, commented, 
“We see before us the most dramatic experiment on the continent. If it succeeds, it will give heart to 
absolutely every country worldwide.”
30
 Several years later, his remarks proved prescient. Botswana’s 
success is cited by a range of stakeholders as having heavily influenced the decisions by other countries 
and major global institutions (such as PEPFAR and the GFATM). For example, ACHAP was cited as a 
model which informed the development of PEPFAR, such as confirming early estimates from pilots 
PEPFAR conducted in Uganda to determine the full cost of providing treatment and in showing that 
treatment would initially roll out slowly but then achieve accelerated growth
31
. The sections that follow 
                                                     
v The Government of Botswana is currently conducting an audit of its estimates of the number of people in need of 
antiretroviral therapy. Preliminary output from this analysis has indicated a coverage rate of approximately 85 percent. This 
process will also result in revisions to historical coverage rates based on changes in the methodology for estimating need.  
“ACHAP's best decision was to take up the hardest task: 
treatment scale-up. It demonstrated that treatment 
scale-up was possible in Africa and provided the proof-
of-concept that was needed.” 
- Dr. Alex Coutinho, Executive Director, 
Infectious Disease Institute (IDI)  
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provide further examples of the influence of ACHAP, including on policies regarding opt-out HIV testing 
and on curricula for health worker training.  
 
 
The country also made some progress in reducing the transmission of HIV.  
The prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) has been a strong success, with 95 percent of 
HIV positive pregnant women receiving treatment, and an overall transmission rate of 3 percent – making 
Botswana the only African country to have already achieved by 2013 the UNAIDS 2015 target of reducing 
the MTCT rate below 5 percent in breastfeeding populations
32
. 
Overall awareness of HIV, testing rates, and condom use are high for the region (Figure 9)
33
. In recent 
years, Botswana made scaling up safe male circumcision (SMC) a national priority and, after a slow start, 
rates of circumcision are increasing. In 2008, 11 percent of males ages 10-64 were circumcised; by 2012, 
this more than doubled to 24 percent
34
.  
 
 
Figure 9: Country comparison on key HIV/AIDS indicators 
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Challenges 
However, Botswana still 
struggles with rates of new 
infection.  
Overall prevalence declined from 
2000, but as shown in Figure 9, the 
decline in overall prevalence has not 
been as pronounced as in some other 
countries (such as Zimbabwe). The 
latest national AIDS survey (2013) 
found overall prevalence at 18.5 
percent, up from 17.6 percent in the 
last survey (2008). For the first time, 
the national survey included incidence 
testing, yielding a rate of just under 3 
percent (comparable to the rates 
identified through statistical modeling 
in the 2008 survey). The high rates of 
new infections are also evident in 
comparing prevalence for specific younger age groups across multiple national surveys (Figure 10), 
which shows substantial increases in HIV prevalence. Given the young age of these groups, this is likely 
the effect of high rates of new infections, rather than a survivor effect. Prevalence rates in young women 
and girls remain of particular concern
35
.  
Note on Incidence and Prevalence Rates 
It is important to note that the data on prevalence and incidence in Botswana require interpretation to 
be meaningful. Prevalence (the portion of the population that is HIV positive) is an imperfect proxy for 
incidence (the rate of new infections in a given time period), but until recently, incidence has not been 
feasible to measure. The data on prevalence in Botswana likely shows two effects: an increase in life 
expectancy among people living with HIV due to the wider availability of treatment, and a continued 
relatively high rate of new infections. Approaches that look at younger cohorts (such as in Figure 10) 
attempt to focus on the effects of new infections, since these age groups are unlikely to have high rates 
of mortality. 
Figure 10: Prevalence rates across age cohorts in Botswana 
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It should be recognized that changing behaviors that drive the epidemic is a tremendous 
challenge – one that is not unique to Botswana.  
The country still struggles with several risk behaviors that drive HIV incidence. ACHAP did make efforts to 
segment high risk populations and study the impact of factors such as alcohol abuse on HIV 
transmission. However, rates of multiple sexual partnerships remain high, with the percentage of adults 
reporting more than one partner in the last year increasing from 11 percent in 2008 to 16 percent in 
2013
36
. This rate is higher than in neighboring countries such as South Africa (13 percent)
37
.  
Finally, there are continued health challenges related to the HIV epidemic that have been 
under addressed, such as the burden of tuberculosis coinfection with HIV.  
Due to the increasing coverage of HIV treatment in the country, the rates of TB infection have dropped: 
case notification rates have declined since 2002, from 623 cases per 100,000 population to 331 as of 
2012. However, there are still areas of major concern: TB cure rates have declined substantially from 
2009 to 2011, as expansion of treatment coverage came at the expense of ideal adherence to protocols. 
Also, the rate of drug-resistant TB has increased, and infections persist among health care workers.  
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How ACHAP Adapted Its Programs to the Changing Context 
As the context changed, ACHAP needed to adapt its work at a programmatic level.  
Given the changes in the context for the partnership, this report examines four major program areas to 
illustrate where ACHAP was able to adapt successfully and where it fell short or could have had 
opportunities for greater impact. These programs represent the greatest areas of investment for ACHAP: 
ARV treatment scale-up, provision of safe male circumcision, behavior-change prevention efforts, and 
activities to address the comorbidities of tuberculosis and HIV
vi
.
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Summary of ACHAP’s adaptation across four program examples 
 
                                                     
vi
 Throughout this report, we reference ACHAP when referring to the activities of the overall partnership, and indicate where 
needed the specific roles of individual partners (Merck, the Gates Foundation, and the Government of Botswana) and of 
ACHAP management.  
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ARV Treatment 
Successful adaptation: Supporting the growth of ARV treatment has been ACHAP’s greatest 
success and is perhaps the best example of how the partnership adapted and learned based on 
the changing context. ACHAP responded to high prevalence rates by working with government to 
build capacity and develop the initial HIV clinics. ACHAP also recognized early on that the lack of 
health workers would be a barrier to scaling treatment and played an important role in addressing 
the need. ACHAP upgraded laboratory facilities across the country, expanding the availability of 
CD4 and HIV viral load testing and dramatically reducing turnaround time for these tests.  
ACHAP aptly recognized the need to decentralize treatment and developed a district strategy to 
deepen reach of treatment. Though there were challenges in rolling out the district strategy, 
ACHAP made a bold decision to pursue the district expansion to expand reach and reduce the 
cost of providing ARV treatment in Botswana. 
Challenges: ACHAP could have explored opportunities to implement treatment as prevention 
further (e.g., a “test and treat” policy) but this would have required an additional commitment of 
resources to expand ARV coverage and substantial assistance to the government in planning and 
in allocation of resources. 
           
 
 
Figure 12: Adaptation examples in ARV treatment  
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ACHAP’s greatest success was in its ability to navigate existing government systems 
and the changing epidemiological context and its ability to work with the 
government to build capacity and develop the initial HIV clinics. 
When launching initial pilots, ACHAP had a limited understanding of the local environment and the 
requirements to scale the treatment program. Experts consulted when ACHAP was established recall 
being engaged on the question of overall feasibility of scaling up treatment. They called the decision to 
launch the partnership a “brave” one, with no clear roadmap
38
 with only high-level targets provided by 
consultants engaged at the outset. Yet the government, the Gates Foundation, and Merck remained 
convinced that the world needed a demonstration at scale, not a targeted pilot.  
ACHAP also played a critical role in building the capacity of the government. ACHAP’s early management 
worked alongside the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA) and the Ministry of Health to create the 
first treatment sites. These early efforts required a substantial amount of preparatory work – more so than 
ACHAP or its funders had anticipated in their initial implementation planning. While the partnership 
benefitted from political support at 
the highest levels, ACHAP needed 
to leverage its private sector 
execution and project 
management abilities to align 
various government departments. 
Early leaders in ACHAP recall the 
range of strategies needed to 
acquire the formal mandate to 
operationalize Masa, which ranged 
from structural considerations 
(ACHAP staff needed to receive 
official appointments into civil 
service in order to formally 
participate in meetings), to 
identifying effective communication 
procedures. The private sector 
approach also streamlined hiring of initial clinical staff, technology procurement and the construction of 
additional clinics which would have otherwise been subject to lengthy hiring processes and procurement 
delays
39
. 
By 2002/2003, the four initial sites enrolled 3,500 patients on antiretroviral therapy
40
. While this early 
progress was impressive, program managers within ACHAP and Masa saw that the growth rate of the 
number of eligible patients on treatment was plateauing, largely due to limited access and uptake of HIV 
testing. With few Batswana knowing their HIV status, the population seeking care remained small. 
ACHAP leaders worked closely with the Government of Botswana to create one of the continent’s first 
policies of opt-out HIV testing, in which health care providers routinely test for HIV unless requested 
Figure 13: Growth in number of patients enrolled in HAART in the public sector  
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otherwise. The policy resulted in substantial increases in testing rates (one Francistown site reported a 
20% increase in testing after policy implementation)
41
. 
The success of Botswana’s efforts in provider-initiated 
testing helped influence other countries to adopt the 
policy, including Zambia (2004), and Uganda (2005). 
In 2006, the CDC recommended that routine provider-
initiated testing and counseling should be standard for 
all adults
42
; UNAIDS and the WHO recommended the 
policy in 2007
43
. While effective, this policy shift was 
somewhat controversial, with areas for further improvement in testing including the logistics of returning 
test results where rapid tests were not available, eliminating test kit stock outs, and ensuring counseling 
approaches did not reinforce stigma or otherwise violate human rights considerations
44
. 
Operations within treatment sites also evolved as the caring for end-stage AIDS patients created 
substantial backlog in the system. To increase the number of patients seen per day, program managers 
introduced triage procedures that designated days when only asymptomatic HIV patients would be 
received
45
.  
Between 2003 and 2004, ACHAP supported the launch of another seven sites, allowing it to expand its 
reach to 11,500 patients on ARV treatment. But to achieve the treatment coverage objectives that 
ACHAP set together with the Government of Botswana, ACHAP needed to build a truly national program. 
Therefore, ACHAP and the Government of Botswana agreed to scale HAART initiation to 128 clinics 
across the country, and ACHAP established standalone Infection Disease Control Clinics (IDCCs) using 
prefabricated structures. This approach accelerated scale-up by an estimated 18-24 months
46
, but also 
isolated HIV and other infectious disease services from the broader health system.  
By September 2008, 113,167 patients were on HAART, reflecting a 78% coverage rate of those in need. 
However, the backlogs remained, with a substantial number of patients still on waiting lists
47
. ACHAP 
spent $5.2M between 2001-2009 on facility construction as well as central supply chain infrastructure 
upgrades
48
. 
ACHAP recognized early on that the lack of health workers (across multiple cadres) 
would be a barrier to scaling treatment and played an important role in addressing 
the need. 
In addition to funding positions within the Botswana health system, ACHAP supported training of health 
workers. In partnership with Harvard University (via the Botswana-Harvard Partnership), ACHAP funded 
the KITSO (“Knowledge, Innovation, and Training Shall Overcome AIDS”) training program, as well as 
preceptorship models for further training. These efforts resulted in over 8,100 health care workers trained 
in HIV care
49
. Stakeholders cited this uniform training and the resulting standardization of clinical 
treatment protocols nationally as a key factor in keeping ARV resistance rates low in the country
50
. 
However, there were challenges with the continuation of KITSO following ACHAP’s commitment to fund 
the program. Transfer of KITSO to the government was pushed back several times. In 2012, ACHAP 
“ACHAP had a step-wise approach to learning about and 
rolling out treatment. It diagnosed why specific 
roadblocks occurred and tweaked its work 
accordingly.”  
- Dr. Ernest Darkoh, Former ACHAP leader  
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provided a grant to build the necessary technical capacity at MOH to take over KITSO. PEPFAR also had 
to provide additional financial support to ensure KITSO’s sustainability.  
ACHAP upgraded laboratory facilities across the country, expanding the availability 
of CD4 count and HIV viral load testing and dramatically reducing turnaround time 
for these tests.  
Early in the scale-up of treatment, CD4 tests took an average of 1-2 weeks, but as volumes increased, 
transportation delays became more frequent and backlogs ensued, leaving patients waiting on average 
seven weeks for test results. By providing funds for equipment as well as staff training, Botswana 
decentralized its CD4 testing capacity from the country’s two referral hospitals to 22 facilities by 2008. 
Turnaround time was consequently reduced to 1-3 days
51
, though periodic issues with unreliable 
transportation for blood samples and machine breakdowns would create delays in later years.  
In 2013, ACHAP made further efforts to reduce the turnaround time for CD4 tests by piloting the use of 
new, lower-cost point of care CD4 testing machines at health centers and major sites of employment, with 
trained lay counselors conducting the tests. The effort is showing promising early results: as of March 
2014, the pilot had conducted 4,252 point of care CD4 tests, and a preliminary comparison of the time 
from positive HIV test to ARV treatment initiation found a reduction from 23 days of waiting time to 12 
days
52
. The hope is that by reducing the turnaround time, ACHAP will reduce the lag time between a 
positive HIV test result and the initiation of ARV treatment, and thereby encourage more people to get 
tested. 
In another effort to reduce delays and increase access to treatment, ACHAP provided technical support to 
Central Medical Stores (CMS) on ARV procurement and forecasting to ensure a more consistent supply 
of ARVs. CMS leaders credit ACHAP audits of ARV supply chains with helping to identify shortfalls in 
other areas as well, such as record-keeping procedures
53
.  
ACHAP aptly recognized the need to decentralize treatment and developed a 
district strategy to deepen reach of treatment. ACHAP made a bold decision to 
pursue the district expansion to extend its reach and reduce the cost of providing 
ARV treatment in Botswana.  
While the first four IDCCs established in Gaborone, Francistown, Maun, and Serowe saw success, to 
reach a more rural and dispersed population required rethinking the overall model of treatment. ACHAP 
shifted to more intensive engagement in 7 focus districts, with program officers posted in each of them, 
allowing for closer involvement in the needs of individual facilities. Through this strategy of deeper, more 
localized engagement, ACHAP was able to adapt to the emergence of new funders of HIV programs in 
Botswana, as PEPFAR began supporting many of the national-level treatment activities previously 
supported by ACHAP.  
ACHAP also continued to adapt by finding opportunities to reduce the cost of providing ARV treatment. 
When rollout began, Botswana’s treatment model was highly resource intensive, drawing many clinical 
practices from Western models of HIV care: doctor-led, with little use of community health workers and 
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intensive lab testing including multiple CD4 count and 
viral load tests per year. A longtime ACHAP board 
member recalled the early cost of treatment as $8,000 
per patient per year, and remembered President 
Mogae as saying, “Don’t leave us with a Cadillac, but 
something we can maintain
54
.” Given early skepticism 
around feasibility of treatment, a conservative 
approach made sense, but it was clear that the model 
would need to adapt over time. As drug costs decreased and services became increasingly decentralized, 
the total cost of treatment was reduced, finally reaching just 10% of the original cost ($800 per patient per 
year)
55
. By 2010, a major ACHAP-supported cohort study by Harvard researchers (the Models of Care 
study) found the annual cost to be as low as $357
56
. Unsurprisingly, given wage differences and higher 
standards of care, this cost is still higher than in many low- and lower-middle income African countries
vii,57
. 
The scale-up of treatment and refining of the model represent a strong success for ACHAP, providing a 
clear example to other donors and countries that treatment was feasible at scale. Countries such as 
Uganda conducted early visits to Botswana and left ready to tackle the ambitious task recognizing that it 
was important to learn at scale rather than wait years for the results of small pilot projects
58
.  
While it would have required a further commitment of resources to expand ARV 
coverage, ACHAP and its funders could have made a more concerted effort to 
implement treatment as prevention. ACHAP also could have achieved greater 
results in strengthening national health information systems.  
ACHAP could have played a more substantial role in advocating and helping the government to plan for 
expanded treatment eligibility. While other work (such as the Models of Care study) helped influence the 
eventual decisions to move treatment eligibility from CD4 counts below 200 to 250 and later 350, ACHAP 
could have been a more vocal proponent for a “test and treat” policy, or for moving to the current WHO 
recommendations of CD4 count <500. An expansion of treatment would require significantly more 
resources. ACHAP’s board did request that ACHAP funders consider putting resources towards 
expanding ARV coverage to include treatment as prevention services, but the strategy was ultimately not 
pursued. With the appropriate resources, ACHAP was well positioned to advocate to the government and 
help the government plan for the resources needed to adopt the policy change, and consider potential 
challenges with managing the increased patient load. ACHAP was also well positioned to support the 
government with developing the national data system for monitoring effectiveness of treatment, but the 
system remained weak. While the development of the national data system is not solely ACHAP’s 
responsibility, the lack of reliable data has been seen as a roadblock for ACHAP throughout the past 15 
years. ACHAP recognized that a national data system was directly linked to its own ability to track 
                                                     
vii A 2012 study by the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) found costs in Malawi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Zambia to be 
lower than in Botswana (ranging from $136 to $278), but costs are higher in South Africa ($682) 
“ACHAP led the effort to decentralize Botswana's HIV 
treatment infrastructure. There is no doubt that Botswana's 
government would have struggled on this front if not for 
ACHAP. They deserve a huge amount of credit for that.”  
- Dr. Joseph Makhema, CEO of the Botswana-
Harvard Partnership 
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progress and measure impact. Though launched in 2001, the national data system consistently had 
inaccuracies in modeling the total number of patients in need of treatment, and lacked information about 
ARV resistance. The government lacked adequately trained staff to develop and maintain a robust 
system at this scale, and there was weak coordination on updating national indicators. By playing a more 
active role in systems capacity development and coordinating national reporting on key indicators, 
ACHAP could have facilitated its own operations and further supported the overall growth of the ARV 
treatment program.  
Safe Male Circumcision  
Successful adaptation: ACHAP’s investment in Safe Male Circumcision (SMC) started with 
slow progress, but grew to become a major contributor to national targets. ACHAP demonstrated 
its ability to incorporate emerging science by being an early adopter of SMC as an HIV prevention 
tactic. ACHAP effectively pivoted approaches when faced with early barriers and limited uptake, 
and experimented with a range of demand generation strategies. These shifts have led to a 
dramatically improved uptake of SMC, and to a more cost-effective approach than other 
implementers in Botswana. 
Challenges: ACHAP initially used the same strategies to scale SMC as it used to scale the ARV 
treatment program, but quickly found that the approach of working through the government 
system was less applicable to SMC and struggled to meet its SMC targets. While ACHAP later 
adjusted its approach to work more independently and did improve results, costs today still 
remain high relative to other programs in the Southern African region. Furthermore, the transfer of 
ACHAP’s lessons learned to the government has been limited to date.  
 
Figure 14: Adaptation examples in SMC 
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ACHAP demonstrated its ability to incorporate emerging science by being an early 
adopter of SMC as an HIV prevention tactic. 
Clinical trials conducted in Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa have demonstrated that male circumcision 
has the potential to reduce the risk of HIV infection in men by roughly 60%. In 2007, UNAIDS and the 
WHO recommended that SMC should be a priority in 14 countries in East and Southern Africa, including 
Botswana, based on models suggesting that if these countries reached 80% coverage of male 
circumcision among men aged 15-49, 3.4 million HIV infections would be prevented by 2025 with a cost 
savings of $16.5 billion
59
. In 2009, the Government of Botswana responded to this recommendation by 
creating an additional prevention strategy specifically focused on SMC, setting its own target of an 80% 
circumcision rate among HIV negative males aged 0-49
60
.  
ACHAP recognized that other prevention efforts such as behavior change were not reducing incidence in 
the country and explored biomedical prevention interventions. At the time, ACHAP was making an 
intentional shift to prevention and exploring a range of different intervention opportunities. Existing 
studies
61
 suggested that a very high rate of acceptance for SMC could be expected among men in 
Botswana. Consequently, ACHAP felt that if it could obtain government buy-in, SMC would be a strong 
strategic option, particularly when compared to other prevention strategies for which the results would be 
more difficult to quantify (for example, behavior change-based prevention among young women and 
girls)
62
. ACHAP committed to a major involvement in SMC, with the goal of contributing to 60% of the 
Government of Botswana’s national target by April 2012. 
Strategies used to scale ARV treatment were less applicable to SMC, and ACHAP 
struggled to meet its SMC targets after the program launched. 
Initially, ACHAP tried a similar strategy for SMC as it had in supporting the government to scale up ARV 
treatment: assisting the government with national strategy development, identifying the gaps in training, 
facilities, and supplies, and infusing resources to enhance the public sector response. ACHAP also 
supported a national communications campaign to 
generate demand for SMC.  
By the end of 2011, ACHAP had made little progress. 
The approach of working within the government 
system had limited impact, in part because the same 
level of urgency for a solution did not exist in 
Botswana as it had at the start of the ARV treatment 
program. Also, doctors trained to perform the 
procedure were frequently pulled into other duties, so service delivery was slow. Additionally, ACHAP and 
other implementing partners underestimated the need for demand generation: early mass communication 
efforts were largely ineffective in creating demand for SMC.  
Faced with this slow pace of achieving results, in 2011 the ACHAP board (representatives from the Gates 
Foundation in particular) became deeply involved in operational decision-making to try to reinvigorate the 
“Circumcision was a challenge for Botswana. When we first 
started, SMC surgeries were done in hospitals and 
emergency wards, and the program didn’t take off. SMC is 
essentially a behavioral intervention, and for men 
the decision takes time. It wasn’t easy at all.” 
- Government of Botswana official 
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effort
63
. The Gates Foundation had played a proactive role in advocating for Botswana to pursue SMC 
programs as a major HIV prevention focus, and the slow progress of ACHAP’s SMC program did 
contribute to the Foundation’s ultimate decision to leave the partnership.  
Faced with early barriers and limited uptake, ACHAP shifted approaches and 
experimented with a range of demand generation strategies. These shifts have led to 
a dramatically improved uptake of SMC, and to a more cost-effective approach 
compared to other implementers in Botswana.  
ACHAP pivoted from the initial approach of working through the government to a more direct approach to 
implementation. ACHAP hired its own clinical teams in focal districts that were dedicated to SMC service 
delivery. Doctors were seconded from government clinics
64
, and ACHAP hired 12 medical officers, 19 
nurses, 10 health care auxiliaries, and 9 counselors
65
. While the new structure allowed ACHAP to achieve 
greater results at scale, it caused some tension with the Ministry of Health (MOH) and other partners as 
doctors were hired at notably higher salaries than the public sector
66
. 
Recognizing that behavior change remained a consistent barrier to SMC uptake, ACHAP began to 
experiment with demand generation activities. In a culture with little recent history of circumcision, 
ACHAP’s initial strategy of mass media marketing was ineffective at driving demand. Realizing that a 
more hands-on approach was needed, ACHAP engaged a number of community-based organizations 
(CBOs) to manage teams of community mobilizers to directly reach potential clients. This strategy 
increased client volumes but proved to be an expensive model, as ACHAP increasingly shifted to direct 
oversight of a mobilizer 
workforce, with incentives paid 
based on the number of clients 
who visited facilities.  
ACHAP’s new demand 
generation strategies became a 
key driver in improving its overall 
SMC results. In 2012, ACHAP 
engaged 270 independent 
mobilizers to conduct outreach at 
the household level through 
door-to-door visits and group 
interaction, as well as school-
based campaigns. Mobilizers 
were paid 80 pula (US$9) for 
each candidate, with additional 
bonuses for exceeding targets
67
. 
Further, while the model has 
been successful at increasing the number of surgeries performed, it also created competition between 
ACHAP’s programs and other SMC implementers for qualified mobilizers and access to more accessible 
Figure 15: Cumulative number of SMC surgeries performed by ACHAP 
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male populations. ACHAP’s decision to provide financial incentives to mobilizers was initially controversial 
among other implementers, but proved to be effective and there have not been reports of unethical 
practices
68
.  
ACHAP is on track with its targeted contributions to the national SMC strategy. ACHAP contributes more 
to national targets than all other implementing partners combined, yet other implementers of SMC 
programs lag behind targets meaning that overall progress in Botswana is behind. In 2011, the 
Government of Botswana revised its national targets to 385,000 adolescents and men aged 13 – 49. 
ACHAP committed to directly contribute 127,000 procedures and its progress has been concentrated 
primarily among school-going boys. While surgeries in younger populations will contribute to prevention 
efforts in the longer term, it is important to note that the overall effect will be delayed
69
. 
The transfer of ACHAP’s lessons learned to the government has been limited to 
date, and costs still remain high relative to other SMC programs in the Southern 
African region. 
While ACHAP has experienced success with its SMC activities, the public sector still struggles with many 
of ACHAP’s initial challenges (for example, competing priorities when integrating SMC with general health 
services). ACHAP has been less successful at embedding and transferring lessons from its own SMC 
program to government. Though ACHAP has spent considerable time sharing results from its SMC 
programs and best practices from its demand generation strategies, the government and other 
implementing partners have been slow to adopt the practices due to internal restrictions and processes. 
This is in part because ACHAP was operating independently as more of an implementer than a funder, 
and transferring lessons would require deeper engagement of ACHAP staff to train government staff 
directly
70
. Stakeholders also cite Botswana’s centralization of primary health services during the later 
years of the partnership as creating challenges for disseminating new practices
71
.  
Botswana is seen as a leader in policy and early adoption of SMC, but the country is also viewed as 
lagging in implementation and cost effectiveness. Even though ACHAP’s demand generation approach  
has created substantial efficiencies with a lower cost per circumcision than the public sector or NGO 
providers, overall costs remain high in comparison to other countries
72
. ACHAP’s average cost per SMC 
procedure started relatively high, at $179 in 2011, and was reduced to $98 per procedure by 2013
73
. A 
2012 study found that the average cost per procedure across 6 sub-Saharan African countries was $49, 
ranging from $22 in South Africa to $70 in Tanzania
74
 – both lower than the $98 cost in Botswana.  
 
 
 
 
Evaluating ACHAP's Performance as a Public-Private Partnership 
           
Adapting through Crisis: Lessons from ACHAP's Contributions to the Fight against HIV/AIDS in Botswana 42 
Behavior Change-based Prevention 
 Successful adaptation: ACHAP did provide support to the government to help lay the 
groundwork for national prevention programs in Botswana; in particular, ACHAP’s transition to a 
district level focus helped provide more customized care. 
 Challenges: Behavior change-based prevention continues to be a challenge for the global 
response to HIV. ACHAP was well positioned to pressure the government to take a leading role in 
addressing this challenge. However, on the whole, ACHAP struggled to support the government 
to find effective behavior change-based prevention interventions, and made minimal contributions 
to prevention through behavior change efforts. The lack of experienced NGOs and implementing 
partners limited ACHAP’s ability to have further impact. Furthermore, ACHAP lacked sufficient 
expertise to support direct program implementation in this area. 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Adaptation examples in behavior change-based prevention 
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ACHAP struggled to support the government to find effective behavior change-
based prevention interventions, and thus made minimal contributions to 
prevention through behavior change efforts.  
ACHAP’s original mandate included a prevention component, and the partnership attempted a range of 
national strategies over its early years, including targeting youth with HIV prevention messages or 
awareness campaigns, launching condom social marketing campaigns, and communicating about the 
risks associated with multiple and concurrent partners; a planned strategy around prevention in young 
women and girls was abandoned due to a lack of proven intervention models.  
Although the lack of impact through prevention efforts 
is disappointing, stakeholders were not entirely 
surprised as behavior change-based prevention 
programming is challenging globally. Few proven 
models exist, and a comprehensive 2010 literature 
review of HIV prevention interventions, evaluated 
through randomized trials found that none of the 
behavior change-focused interventions included in the review demonstrated a statistically significant 
impact on incidence
75
.  
ACHAP’s support did help to build a foundation for national prevention programs 
in Botswana.  
ACHAP played an important role in building a foundation for prevention programs nationally, through its 
role in developing national strategic plans and supporting condom procurement. ACHAP was a major 
direct purchaser of condoms (funding 40% of condoms in the country in 2008)
76
, and, worked to 
strengthen Central Medical Stores when supply chains and procurement became a challenge (as 
previously discussed). ACHAP also seconded staff with behavior change communications skills into 
several ministries to promote better 
coordination. 
ACHAP should be commended for rejecting 
approaches that proved to be ineffective. 
For several years, ACHAP provided funding 
for Talk Back, a TV program aimed at 
equipping teachers with communication 
tools to relay HIV prevention messages to students. The program did create awareness with ~10% of 
students in the country watching the program live, but evaluations found substantial operational 
challenges and a lack of clear targeting of messages. Consequently, ACHAP withdrew its support for the 
program
77
.
 
 
The capacity constraints among local implementers and limited targeting of condom social marketing 
efforts have been cited in previous evaluations. ACHAP did adjust its approach to these partnerships; for 
“I think we've gotten complacent in recent years: 
prevention, and not mortality, is now the main issue. But 
it's hard to present prevention as an urgent need, 
and so the response to the HIV epidemic has slowed.” 
- Government of Botswana official  
“ACHAP’s 7 districts outperformed the 
government supported districts, and NACA was 
very impressed with their work. But minimal skills 
were transferred to other districts.”  
- Government of Botswana official  
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example, when a program of small grants to community-based organizations and local NGOs was 
consistently unable to show measurable results, ACHAP ended the program.  
ACHAP’s transition to a district level focus helped provide more customized 
support. 
ACHAP also adapted some aspects of its broader strategy to reflect a more customized prevention 
approach. Specifically, ACHAP began to focus intensively in seven districts in the country, working with 
local district multi-sectoral AIDS committees (DMSACs) to help them develop customized community 
plans around HIV prevention and care in addition to the treatment activities previously described. This 
process resulted in deeper focus and tailoring of activities; however, local leaders reflected that in 
practice, ACHAP tended to drive the strategic focus of these plans, rather than allowing for true local 
ownership
78
. ACHAP’s commitment to create local ownership created expectations that local leadership 
would drive the strategic direction of the efforts. Therefore, ACHAP’s active involvement in the strategic 
planning process created complications. Some stakeholders noted that ACHAP’s working style at the 
district level was also viewed as undermining existing public sector structures by local and regional 
government: the ACHAP staff in districts were viewed as a parallel structure undermining the authority of 
the local District AIDS Coordinators
79
. 
Note on ACHAP’s Role at the District Level 
By 2005, ACHAP realized that increasing ARV uptake and deepening the reach of prevention services 
would require more locally-tailored strategies. In conjunction with the Government of Botswana, 
ACHAP selected 7 of Botswana’s 26 districts for deeper engagement. The focus districts were chosen 
to reflect a diverse sample across key demographic criteria such as prevalence, population density, 
and population mobility. In later years, ACHAP also took a focused approach in other sets of select 
districts for its work on programs such as SMC and TB.  
While ACHAP-supported districts have shown greater reduction in HIV prevalence 
than in other locations, there has been minimal sharing of lessons and best 
practices with other districts. 
Overall, this strategy had impact on the epidemic, as ACHAP-supported districts had higher than average 
reductions in prevalence over the time period of the partnership. Between 2004 and 2013, HIV 
prevalence in the seven ACHAP-supported districts fell on average from 18.2% to 15.8%, where 
prevalence in districts which were not supported by ACHAP rose from 16.4% to 16.9%. Yet a persistent 
challenge with the district strategy has been the practical uptake of lessons learned between different 
districts, despite ACHAP’s support of multiple convenings and data platforms.  
Stakeholders have also helped put the outcomes of ACHAP’s prevention work in context, suggesting that 
early on, ACHAP did not collaborate sufficiently with organizations already funding or implementing 
prevention activities in the country, and should have funded or partnered with organizations that had 
expertise in behavior change and demand generation rather than trying to build that capacity internally
80
. 
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Others noted that when ACHAP shifted its primary emphasis from treatment to prevention, the 
organization did not adapt its internal expertise, and that staff and management with public sector 
backgrounds were not optimally equipped for the more sociological challenges of prevention work
81
. 
Furthermore, ACHAP lacked sufficient expertise to support direct program 
implementation in this area.  
In 2009, ACHAP developed a behavior 
change-based strategy for addressing 
the high prevalence rates among 
young women and girls. After going 
through an extensive strategic planning 
process, ACHAP’s leadership decided 
not to implement the strategy itself 
after failing to identify a feasible plan 
that they would be able to execute. Though this is a topic on which many in the field struggle, leadership 
at ACHAP viewed the decision to abandon the strategy as a failure to address an area of major need in 
Botswana
82
. 
  
“ACHAP faced two difficulties in developing its Phase 2 
Prevention strategy. First, its senior leadership lacked 
sufficient experience in prevention. Second, the strategy 
was a risky one without a solid evidence base, and so donors 
struggled to agree on it.” 
- Dr. David Harrison, Former ACHAP board member  
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Tuberculosis Prevention and Treatment  
 Successful adaptation: ACHAP recognized the continued high burden of TB in the country, 
and elevated TB/HIV as a major component of its strategy in 2009. ACHAP supported the 
government to design policies and practices that created a platform for collaborative treatment of 
TB and HIV, and facilitated integration of some best practices for treating TB across the public 
sector. 
 Challenges: ACHAP saw a consistent need in the country to address TB prevention and 
treatment earlier on, but adopted explicit strategies fairly late in its history and without a broader 
plan for uptake of its supported pilots. Though ACHAP has made some progress, its overall 
strategy and plan for government uptake in TB programming remains unclear. 
 
 
 
 
ACHAP saw a consistent need in the country to address TB prevention and 
treatment, but adopted explicit strategies fairly late in its history and without a 
broader plan for uptake of its supported pilots.  
While the first MOU between ACHAP and the Government of Botswana included language about 
prevention and treatment of opportunistic infections, ACHAP did not actively focus on TB in its early 
years. An ACHAP board member commented that until ACHAP began considering TB efforts in 2007, the 
HIV and TB control programs in the country operated in silos, despite the close ties between the two 
epidemics
83
. ACHAP rightly recognized the need to bridge this treatment gap and address the opportunity 
to reduce deaths among the TB/HIV co-infected population in Botswana.  
ACHAP’s early areas of support centered on catalyzing national activities on TB, though these efforts had 
limited impact: for example, technical support to the national TB strategy team, staffing coordinators at 
Figure 17: Adaptation examples in TB 
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the district level, and strengthening diagnostic capabilities in laboratories. A 2008 evaluation of ACHAP 
found that these early objectives have for the most part been achieved, though rates of TB case 
notification and TB/HIV co-infection are still high. In 2007, TB still accounted for an estimated 44% of 
deaths in HIV/AIDS cases.
84
 
ACHAP recognized the continued high burden of TB in the country, elevated 
TB/HIV as a major component of its strategy in 2009, and supported the 
government to develop policies and a coordination platform at the national level to 
address TB needs across the country.  
ACHAP specifically engaged in two approaches to effectively tackle TB: (1) an effort to enhance the 
government’s response through facilities improvements related to infection prevention and hiring of TB 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) officers, and (2) a pilot effort around DOTS (directly observed treatment, 
short-course) for TB treatment via community supporters, a model widely used elsewhere but not in 
Botswana. Employed alongside universal access to ARV therapy, these measures contributed to an 
estimated reduction in TB incidence across Botswana, as the annual TB notification rate per 100,000 
people fell from 536 in 2008 to 331 in 2012
85
.  
In addition, ACHAP supported the government to develop a set of policies and coordination mechanisms 
at the national level to treat TB through the public system. This platform included committees that meet 
regularly to discuss resource allocation and share progress across districts. Despite these coordination 
mechanisms, TB programming still competes with HIV for funding and efforts around capacity building 
and community mobilization are showing mixed results. 
Despite these efforts, tackling TB remains a major challenge for Botswana and 
ACHAP.  
Within the 14 districts ACHAP supports with its TB work, over 80% of reported TB cases since January of 
2013 are new. Even though almost 100% of registered TB patients are now tested for HIV, the 
percentage of TB patients who are coinfected with HIV has stayed relatively constant (55%) since 2013. 
In addition, there are continued high rates of new infections in health care workers, and the percentage of 
TB patients suffering from multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) has risen slightly from 0.8% in 
2013, to 1% in early 2014.  
District capacity building is a critical component of ACHAP’s efforts around TB. While ACHAP has 
supported efforts to train health care workers on TB and TB/HIV case management in all 14 districts and 
TB Infection Control Guidelines are available in all health facilities, there are still reports of failures within 
the public sector to follow established protocols
86
. 
While the TB treatment and prevention activities ACHAP supported since 2009 have resulted in a number 
of tangible changes at the facility level in key districts, the plan for scaling these more broadly is unclear. 
While the DOTS model has shown results at a local level, the plan for broader scale is not known and 
would require closer partnership with the government to develop a national plan and secure additional 
resources
87
.  
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Evaluating ACHAP's Performance as a Public-Private Partnership 
FSG identified five characteristics of high-performing public-private partnerships, based on a review of 
literature
88
and examples of leading partnerships in global health broadly
viii
 and in Botswana
89
. This 
analysis is intended to build on previous efforts to generate lessons from the partnership dynamics of 
ACHAP
90,91
, evaluate ACHAP’s organizational effectiveness, and frame lessons learned that are relevant 
for other global health partnerships. 
 
 
 
ACHAP serves as a strong example among public-private partnerships for its ability to adapt its overall 
strategy and role, leverage the power of the private sector, and nurture partnerships with government. 
However, ACHAP struggled in other areas, such as investing in knowledge and planning for long-term 
sustainability of the organization and supported programs. 
 
 
                                                     
viii See Figure 20 in the Appendix for a comparison of relevant PPPs 
Figure 18: Five characteristics of high-performing PPPs 
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Figure 19: ACHAP’s performance based on each of the five characteristics  
While the comparison to other public-private partnerships is informative, it is important to note how 
ACHAP differed from these other partnerships. The situation in Botswana imparted a sense of urgency 
and risk tolerance that is not present in many other examples. ACHAP’s support had an outsized 
importance to the national response when compared with other public-private partnerships due to its 
comprehensive scope. Relative to the size of its task, ACHAP was better funded than many comparable 
initiatives, with high-intensity investment in a small, middle-income country, rather than funding spread 
across multiple geographies with more diffuse focus.  
Adapt Overall Strategy and Role 
Summary of ACHAP’s performance: ACHAP made a successful shift in its programmatic 
approach from one that was focused on working within government systems as a way to catalyze 
change to a more independent approach focused on innovating and piloting new programs. This 
shift allowed ACHAP to stay relevant to the epidemic as the context for its work changed. ACHAP 
was originally set up to deliver on a five year commitment in an emergency context, and thus did 
not need a long-term strategic plan. However, as it became clear that ACHAP would exist beyond 
the initial mandate, ACHAP’s leadership should have been more intentional about setting a 
strategic plan to help the partnership execute and align resources as it adapted. Without the 
guidance of a high-level strategy, ACHAP did not sufficiently shift internal staff capabilities and 
expertise, align efforts with external partners, and integrate lessons from program successes and 
failures to maximize potential impact. 
Evaluating ACHAP's Performance as a Public-Private Partnership 
           
Adapting through Crisis: Lessons from ACHAP's Contributions to the Fight against HIV/AIDS in Botswana 50 
 
ACHAP’s partnership model set an example as an innovative approach for building 
capacity within an existing system and scaling a national program. 
Merck and the Gates Foundation designed ACHAP as a public-private partnership to work closely with 
the government and help catalyze change at the national level. ACHAP provided valuable skills and 
strategic planning support (both directly, and via staff secondment) in addition to funding and donated 
ARV drugs. This partnership model allowed ACHAP to be reactive to the government and population 
needs and provide a range of flexible resources and assets to address a complex issue. At the time, other 
funders typically supported programs that operated independently from the government and maintained 
more distant relationships. ACHAP’s approach was innovative for the time and set an example for others 
to follow. Early leaders in HIV did see ACHAP as an example, with some claiming that ACHAP created a 
pathway for PEPFAR’s entry to Botswana in 2004.  
Working within existing systems to catalyze change was an effective model to achieve scale and leverage 
government resources and ensure support and buy-in. The decision to build capacity and fund portions of 
programs across the government’s broader ART program, however, made it challenging for ACHAP to 
receive credit for all its contributions to the treatment scale up. For example, to initiate the implementation 
of the National Strategic Framework, ACHAP funded 74 staff within the government who provided 
strategic and technical support.
92
 While this support was critical for the government to implement its 
HIV/AIDS efforts, the behind the scenes nature of ACHAP’s support made it difficult to tie successes and 
failures to its contributions.  
ACHAP successfully adapted to the changing context in Botswana and shifted its 
programmatic approach from working within government systems to piloting 
programs independently. 
By 2008, ACHAP and the Government of Botswana had accomplished a substantial part of their implicit 
original goal, with over 113,000 people on treatment; this allowed both entities to expand focus to other 
areas.
93
 ACHAP decided to shift to a more independent approach where it could pilot and experiment with 
new interventions and then work with the government or other funders to adopt or scale specific programs 
and practices. This shift was also partly driven by ACHAP’s funders, who put increased pressure on 
management to show tangible and measureable results. 
 
ACHAP lacked an overarching strategic plan causing it at times to fail to align staff 
skills, coordinate with external players, and integrate lessons from successful 
programs on an annual basis. 
ACHAP did manage to successfully shift between the two approaches to more independent programmatic 
execution – a significant accomplishment. The shift was made in large part as a reaction to the changing 
context rather than with strategic intention, and as a result ACHAP did not adequately capitalize on areas 
to align with partners and ensure it had the internal skills and expertise to deliver. It is understandable that 
ACHAP was not formed with a long-term strategic plan in place, given it was originally created with a five 
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year mandate and operated in an emergency context. But, as ACHAP moved out of its initial 
entrepreneurial stage of work and explored expanding to the districts, ACHAP’s leadership should have 
put in place a more formal plan with milestones to assess results and ensure the partnership had the 
resources necessary to execute on the plan.  
For example, the shift to a more independent 
approach required more entrepreneurial managers 
willing to experiment with new programs and tactics. 
ACHAP staff involved in the transition process argued 
that the organization was missing critical management 
roles to oversee the new program areas, making it 
difficult to complete tasks. They also expressed a need 
for more marketing and sales staff with entrepreneurial experience.
94
  
Later, as ACHAP became increasingly independent as a technical implementer, the need for strategic 
planning became even more apparent. As ACHAP moved to direct implementation, its leadership did 
make an effort to coordinate the transition with government, but could have been more intentional about 
assigning individual roles and responsibilities as well as sharing best practices. For example, although 
ACHAP initially worked with the government to align targets for SMC and utilized the public health system 
to implement the program, after early results exposed implementation challenges, ACHAP shifted 
approaches to pilot its own SMC program in its seven partner districts. Meanwhile, the government and 
CDC, funded by PEPFAR, agreed to continue implementing SMC in other districts. The lack of long-term 
strategic planning initially has implications today as ACHAP explores new funding sources and 
contemplates various strategic directions. 
ACHAP could also have been more explicit about when and how the government could learn from its 
innovative strategies to increase SMC numbers, such as using performance-based mobilizer incentives to 
bring in new potential clients for SMC. ACHAP did meet with the government and CDC regularly to 
discuss SMC progress
95
, but while ACHAP’s results improved, other implementing partners struggled to 
meet targets and slowed Botswana’s overall progress in achieving its male circumcision goal. Without 
more intentional knowledge transfer, there was no assurance that the government or other implementing 
partners would adopt and benefit from implementing the new and innovative program practices at scale. 
This became especially important in late 2013, as CDC decided to stop funding SMC implementation in 
the country, leaving ACHAP to take over a portion of its assigned territories
96
. 
 
 
 
 
 
“We were successful at the beginning during the treatment 
scale up, but we should have structurally made that 
transformation internally when we shifted from 
treatment to prevention.” 
- Dr. Luke Nkinsi, Former ACHAP board chair  
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Leverage the Power of the Private Sector 
Summary of ACHAP’s performance: ACHAP hired entrepreneurial managers to navigate 
the unknown environment and support the rapid scale up of Botswana’s ARV treatment program. 
ACHAP also engaged board members in project planning and implementation, leveraging their 
private sector expertise. As ACHAP decentralized treatment efforts and transitioned to a new 
strategic approach, it relied more heavily on the board to provide the private sector orientation 
and pace of execution, rather than embedding these skills throughout the organization.  
ACHAP started with a nimble, independent group of managers with private sector 
skills which allowed it to effectively support the rapid scaling of the ARV treatment 
program. 
While many expect the private sector to largely contribute financial resources, Merck was unique in its 
interest in contributing management and private sector expertise to ACHAP. At the outset, ACHAP 
brought in entrepreneurial managers which helped to scale the treatment program and overcome barriers 
to scale: Dr. Donald de Korte, an executive with Merck’s affiliate in South Africa
97
, led the organization, 
and Dr. Ernest Darkoh, a physician and former management consultant who had worked on the initial 
treatment feasibility assessment and treatment plan in Botswana, served as ARV Program Manager for 
Masa. The flexibility allowed the managers to make quick decisions, spend resources as needed, and 
respond to information in real time. Though this was largely an effective approach and allowed ACHAP to 
move quickly to get the program up and running, ACHAP’s results-oriented style did at times alienate 
some managers and staff at government ministries and other implementing partners.  
As ACHAP moved past initial scale-up and looked toward transferring the ARV treatment program fully 
over to the government, the board felt that it was important to transition to local leadership with existing 
government relationships. While this transition made sense for the stage and maturity of the organization 
and the need to sustain results through the public sector in the long term, it had implications for ACHAP’s 
ability to continue to deliver results at the same pace. 
ACHAP’s funders made a strategic decision to provide flexible funding which gave 
management the flexibility to experiment with new approaches and remain 
reactive to their environment. 
The initial commitment by the Merck Foundation and the Gates Foundation to contribute $100M over five 
years to the partnership had few restrictions on expenditures, which further enhanced ACHAP’s ability to 
adapt. Though ACHAP and the Government of Botswana set targets for the treatment program upfront, 
once the partners began to implement the program, both soon realized the significant barriers to scale. 
The flexibility of the funders allowed ACHAP to experiment with new approaches to treatment and fill 
gaps identified by the government as needing resources. The flexible funding structure evolved over time 
to become more rigid and tied to specific outcomes, but it provided significant value in the early years by 
encouraging innovation and experimentation. 
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ACHAP leveraged the private sector expertise of its board at times to strengthen its 
implementation practices. 
The Merck representatives on ACHAP’s board varied in their specific areas of expertise, with 
backgrounds in corporate responsibility, HIV medicine, and global health policy; however, all brought 
deep private sector experience and a focus on results. The Gates Foundation representatives were also 
able to contribute valuable experience from other public-private partnership investments and HIV/AIDS 
programs. Particularly as ACHAP achieved initial ARV treatment scale up, the board’s private sector skills 
became more relevant for ACHAP’s implementation activities. For example, as ACHAP moved to support 
treatment roll-out at the district level, it had limited experience or understanding about how to execute at 
this level. The board’s engagement helped ACHAP’s management and staff to identify opportunities to 
support district level structures and efforts such as condom distribution
98
. 
At this time, ACHAP also transitioned to a management team that had experience with the Government of 
Botswana, in part to build stronger connections with the government; this allowed the board to focus on 
the strategy and implementation of ACHAP’s program activities. In 2005, Dr. Themba Moeti, a former 
Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Health, was appointed Managing Director of ACHAP. 
According to stakeholders, there were benefits to the new management’s style, including enhanced 
collaboration with implementing partners such as CDC
99
. ACHAP was not intentional about embedding 
the private sector skills from the early management into the staff and internal systems developed within 
the organization. Instead, some ACHAP board members attempted to address the change by becoming 
increasingly hands on and monitoring implementation more closely, especially as ACHAP expanded to 
the district level
100
. The board did continue to encourage ACHAP’s management to measure progress at 
the district level more rigorously to allow for better tracking of progress. 
The board remained engaged in implementation and placed increasing pressure on management and 
staff to deliver results. This was particularly the case with the SMC program which experienced slow 
progress early on. The exit of the Gates Foundation from the partnership in particular heavily affected the 
organization’s morale, leading to concerns about the future of the organization both internally and among 
partners. When the Gates Foundation exited the partnership in 2012, many staff attributed the withdrawal 
to their own failure to hit the SMC targets and achieve better results with the SMC program, an outcome 
that could have been avoided by better communication about strategic intentions and staff 
performance
101
. 
As ACHAP expanded, decentralized programs, and transitioned to new strategic 
approaches, it struggled to maintain the same level of private sector expertise 
throughout the organization and coordinate with crucial partners.  
Between 2004 and 2006, ACHAP went through multiple management transitions. As ACHAP explored 
new programs and approaches, staff expressed concern about the future of the partnership. There were a 
few staff departures and in general staff turnover remained relatively low between 2006 and 2011
102
. 
There was also little addition of new employees with different skill sets, especially between 2006 and 
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2008. ACHAP’s board and management underestimated the importance of having formal performance 
management systems to help grow staff internally and replace underperforming staff as needed.  
Then, to address inadequacies in staff skills, ACHAP added a number of new staff. Between 2010 and 
2012, ACHAP’s staff size increased from 52 to 145
103
. According to former leaders in the organization, 
these additions (without commensurate restructuring of positions) meant that by 2011, ACHAP was 
overstaffed and the organization was consequently burdened with high costs. ACHAP did hire an external 
consultant to conduct a reorganizational study, which recommended defining structures and processes to 
improve internal coordination, improving culture and staff collaboration, and acquiring the right technical 
skills to implement new programs. However, the implementation of these recommendations was delayed, 
limiting their impact on ACHAP’s performance
104
. Since 2012, ACHAP has made substantial changes to 
its staffing structure to address these professional development and human resource challenges and to 
foster some of the initial management’s agile and entrepreneurial approach.  
Furthermore, ACHAP’s limited long-term strategic planning efforts affected its ability to coordinate with 
other implementing partners. After the initial ARV treatment program was established, ACHAP improved 
coordination with CDC and worked with international NGOs such as PSI to implement prevention 
programs including mass marketing campaigns and condom distribution efforts. Coordination efforts 
continued as ACHAP began implementing programs directly. While there were regular meetings between 
ACHAP, the government, and other implementing partners, there was limited long-term planning and 
rather a focus on short-term coordination. 
 
Nurture Partnerships with Government 
Summary of ACHAP’s performance: ACHAP chose to work closely with the Government of 
Botswana, and positioned itself to provide strategic guidance and human resource support in 
addition to funding. ACHAP designed systems and structures to support the ongoing close 
relationship with the government, and ensured alignment and buy-in from key government 
stakeholders at the national and local levels at the outset. ACHAP engaged top political 
leadership through the Madikwe Forum and seconded staff into ministries to ensure coordination 
at a tactical level. As national priorities shifted, ACHAP’s model for engagement lost some 
effectiveness: the partnership structures were viewed as less relevant to national priorities and 
participation in venues such as the Madikwe Forum declined.  
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ACHAP created an innovative partnership with the government, providing strategic 
guidance in addition to funding and human resource support. ACHAP was 
intentional about putting systems and structures in place to support the ongoing 
relationship it built with government, and ensure alignment and buy-in from key 
government stakeholders at the national and local levels.  
ACHAP secured support at the presidential level from the outset, giving it significant control over how it 
allocated its resources. The high level political engagement also gave ACHAP’s management access to 
government systems and the flexibility to scale programs quickly. ACHAP was able to selectively leverage 
this support to remove specific road blocks and begin to scale the ARV treatment program. ACHAP’s 
close relationship with the government also allowed it to build programs that could be transitioned to the 
government and would not remain as parallel systems. 
To deepen its early relationships with government, ACHAP first created the Application Review 
Committee, which included Government of Botswana civil servants, and was meant as a mechanism for 
the government to review and approve applications for ACHAP funding.105 Soon after starting the 
committee, ACHAP found that this committee did not have the influence to coordinate activities at the 
national level106. Consequently, in 2004, ACHAP created the Madikwe Forum, a joint governance 
structure between ACHAP and senior Government of Botswana officials. This Forum met three times a 
year to align implementation activities, share information on relevant HIV/AIDS policies, and address 
barriers to ACHAP’s program execution107. The Forum included Permanent Secretaries from all of the key 
ministries involved in the AIDS response as well as NACA, members of the ACHAP board, and the 
ACHAP managing director. The Madikwe Forum helped the ACHAP board members and government 
officials to build a useful foundation of trust and coordination, especially as ACHAP supported the scaling 
of the ARV treatment program. This allowed ACHAP’s leadership to bring up challenging issues regularly 
and address roadblocks to the treatment scale up. 
Note on Implications of ACHAP’s Governance Structure 
ACHAP’s board served both as a mechanism for leading the organization (including for collaborating 
with government through the Madikwe Forum), and as one for engaging the funders. By taking seats 
on the board, Merck and the Gates Foundation committed to a hands-on role in driving the strategic 
direction of the organization. This structure worked well especially while ACHAP had access to flexible 
funding and the funder, management and partner interests were aligned. As government priorities 
shifted and ACHAP adapted its approach and programs, the dual role of the funders created some 
complications for the organization. This was especially an issue as ACHAP management planned for 
the long-term sustainability of the organization. Board members that also served as funder 
representatives were responsible for representing the strategic interests of the funders and ensuring 
ACHAP delivered on its programs and showed results. At the same time, ACHAP leadership was 
planning for the long-term financial sustainability of the organization. As a result, it was not always 
clear what was the real intent of the funders and what was in the interest of ACHAP specifically. 
 
           
Adapting through Crisis: Lessons from ACHAP's Contributions to the Fight against HIV/AIDS in Botswana 55 
Evaluating ACHAP's Performance as a Public-Private Partnership 
The Madikwe Forum allowed for the participation of government, but did not give the government direct 
control. ACHAP created a model that served as a middle ground between the type of relationship that 
PEPFAR has with governments (which allows for close coordination but necessitates a slow pace of 
change), and the one that country programs led by outside NGOs might have (where the relationship is 
more about license to operate than actual alignment of strategies). Both models have merit but need the 
right coordination mechanisms to be able to facilitate effective communication and trust between partners. 
The Madikwe Forum represented a balance between coordination with government and alignment of 
priorities on the one hand, and independence and flexibility of execution on the other.  
However, this model hinges on all partners having clarity on timeframes and objectives. Now, as the end 
date of ACHAP’s currently committed funding draws near, there have been challenges in continuing open 
dialogue and accountability between ACHAP and the Government of Botswana.  
ACHAP’s model required crucial engagement from government to be effective, so 
as new players entered the field and national priorities shifted, ACHAP struggled 
to maintain its relationships and the effectiveness of its collaboration model. 
For ACHAP, the Madikwe Forum was an effective structure for engaging high-level political leadership in 
the early years, but as ACHAP transitioned its approach and the external environment shifted, the Forum 
became less influential. As time went on, ACHAP’s board and management had difficulties aligning with 
government interests, and the Madikwe Forum became a less effective mechanism for communicating 
the organization’s priorities to government at senior levels108. For example, some stakeholders expressed 
that ACHAP leadership did not sufficiently build government buy-in when planning for SMC 
implementation109. Studies of the Forum also observe that it did not have enough focus on action items at 
meetings and did not report on progress measures.110 Also, after 2009, Permanent Secretary participation 
in the Madikwe Forum began to wane, and lower-level delegates would attend in their stead111. High 
turnover among Permanent Secretaries also made it challenging for ACHAP to align and maintain 
consistency in execution112. 
ACHAP adapted its approach to implementation to account for this change, but did not adequately revise 
its mechanisms for engaging top level leadership. The Madikwe Forum was initially useful to remove 
specific barriers to scaling services, but over time, there was a need for more forward-looking planning 
mechanisms. ACHAP needed to adapt its approach to communication with the government to match its 
new, more independent programmatic approach to implementation. For example, ACHAP could have 
taken members of the Madikwe Forum to other countries to observe programs that ACHAP could help 
scale in Botswana. ACHAP could have also explored bringing in new experts and partners into the Forum 
to make it a more collaborative platform. 
Finally, while high-level leadership was consistently important for strategic alignment purposes, 
maintaining connections at functional levels gave ACHAP access to critical information and insight into 
detailed program planning. ACHAP built these connections by seconding employees with expertise in 
strategy and evaluation to provide additional support to NACA and the Ministries of Health, Education, 
Labor, and Local Government. Secondment served an additional purpose of ensuring information flowed 
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back to ACHAP, allowing the partnership to stay attuned to government needs and priorities. This helped 
ACHAP leverage government scale while still contributing its private sector expertise. Some stakeholders 
mentioned that prevention programming, which did not use the secondment model as extensively, 
suffered from limited government engagement at the ministry and local government levels113. 
 
 
Invest in Knowledge 
Summary of ACHAP’s performance: While ACHAP was effective at using data to guide 
program-level tactical decisions; it consistently underinvested in its learning and evaluation staff, 
systems, and expertise. For example, while it collected a wide range of data from its seven focus 
districts, ACHAP did not effectively promote sharing information across them, or with non-ACHAP 
districts. The Government of Botswana also struggled to develop a robust system, even though 
ACHAP contributed financial and human resource support. More broadly, ACHAP also did not 
adequately invest in effective dissemination of its learnings. While the partnership published 
frequently in medical journals and put out communications pieces, it could have invested more 
proactively in implementation of research and lessons that would have been most useable by and 
relevant to the field. Others in the sector also struggled with development of effective learning and 
evaluation systems. Especially in later years as more examples of effective systems emerged, 
ACHAP could have invested more resources and staff in developing a robust monitoring, 
evaluation and learning system. 
During its first few years of operation, ACHAP was effective at assessing needs and 
barriers in real time; this use of agile, data-driven decision making helped scale the 
treatment program at a rapid pace.  
The original Masa team developed an initial operational plan that was very open. There was a substantial 
amount of negotiation with local government, NACA, the MOH, and national leadership to navigate legal 
and budget hurdles in the years before the first sites were established. While the team wanted to set up a 
decentralized system at the outset, they decided instead to build on the existing infrastructure in 
Gaborone and Francistown. The team negotiated budgeting, legal and other hurdles in those years to get 
the first sites established. While the permitting processes could typically take up to 18 months, ACHAP’s 
management began to begin construction on the clinics in advance of receiving the correct permits, 
speeding up the development process114. 
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At a national level, the Government of Botswana consistently struggled with 
implementing a shared data platform that would align programs and identify gaps, 
despite support from ACHAP. 
When ACHAP began to support the treatment scale up process, there was no national data system. 
There were also few computers in use, and front-line workers required substantial training on basic IT 
skills before such a system could be used. Though not entirely ACHAP’s responsibility, ACHAP was well 
positioned to support the government to develop a rigorous M&E system. ACHAP supported the initial 
design and continued maintenance of government IT and monitoring systems, such as the Botswana HIV 
and AIDS Response Information System (BHRIMS)
115
. BHRIMS focused on seven critical elements such 
as demographic data and basic patient tracking including CD4 count information. Masa program 
managers experimented with assigning specific days for treating higher CD4 counts patients to manage 
demand for services, but this had limited impact on the staff’s ability to handle patient flow.  
While ACHAP’s management provided needed support to launch the system, the paper-based system 
created was fragmented and included multiple reporting systems leading to poor data quality. As a result, 
the government struggled to aggregate the data at the national level
116
. The government still struggles to 
collect reliable data, and experienced recent challenges with its estimates of that total national ARV need. 
Of particular concern is the future of public sector M&E staff positions: stakeholders report that presently 
all M&E officers in key ministries are funded by donor programs, many of which will soon decrease 
support
117
. 
ACHAP did not adequately use data beyond the context of individual programs to 
drive learning; it did not invest in cross-site sharing of lessons, or set up programs 
with clear evaluation plans in place. While it is important to acknowledge 
challenges, such as the sense of urgency during the early crisis and the lack of local 
expertise in health program monitoring and evaluation, the ACHAP board could 
have more actively elevated this area as a need, particularly in later years.  
ACHAP did not establish clear metrics or targets at the outset. Furthermore, ACHAP did not hire staff with 
the necessary experience and expertise to develop a comprehensive system for measuring and 
evaluating progress against these targets. This shortcoming was in part a result of the sense of urgency 
and newness of the program. But by not tracking its impact closely, ACHAP did not adequately use data 
to inform or adjust its strategic course based on early successes and failures. M&E activities almost 
always came after the program design process, and ACHAP’s annual planning and decision making 
process was not rooted in performance data, which limited its ability to build on program successes 
and/or abandon processes or programs that were ineffective
118
. 
Capturing impact data requires careful site selection, clear evaluation approaches to connect investments 
to impact, and prioritization of these data to share program successes and innovations with other 
countries or partners. After new management joined in 2006, ACHAP hired more M&E staff to address 
the need for better tracking and impact data of its own programs
119
. The ACHAP Support Plan 2005-2009 
outlined specific research priorities and program objectives for ACHAP
120
; however, an evaluation of 
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ACHAP in late 2008 found that the research had limited impact because most studies were standalone 
and not integrated into program activities121. In general, most research funded by ACHAP was done by 
external consultants or academic partners, so ACHAP did not develop these skills internally122.  
The fact that ACHAP lacked baseline data also remained a consistent challenge. As ACHAP expanded to 
focus on seven partner districts, the lack of a systematic process for capturing best practices made it 
particularly difficult to transfer lessons from its 
districts to other non-ACHAP supported areas123. 
The board did urge ACHAP management to 
integrate M&E and research into programs, but the 
board ultimately did not hold management 
accountable for follow-through on these 
recommendations124. 
While ACHAP has recently strengthened its M&E 
staff and capabilities, even recent programs have not been designed to measure impact from the outset. 
In its treatment optimization pilot, ACHAP conducted a comparative study of time to ARV treatment 
initiation before and after introduction of point-of-care CD4 testing machines125 but did not set up a 
comparable data set to compare and track impact that would allow them to transfer lessons to other 
districts126. As of April 2014, ACHAP still exhibited gaps in recording and reporting tools for its TB and 
TB/HIV programs127, though ACHAP’s management expressed that they will integrate more 
comprehensive impact measurement practices once the programs are up and running.  
While ACHAP served as an important example to the broader global health 
community, it could have been more intentional and proactive about how it shared 
lessons.  
ACHAP built capacity to monitor program 
activities, but did not build the systems needed to 
capture the health outcomes of its efforts. This is 
not unique to ACHAP: many comparable 
initiatives globally, especially those operating at 
the country level, could more actively capture and 
share implementation learnings with other 
programs. As previously discussed, the scale-up 
of HIV treatment in Botswana was a key example 
in demonstrating feasibility to other donors and 
countries. Despite this early external influence, stakeholders identified fewer subsequent examples of 
lessons being shared globally. ACHAP did generate an impressive volume of academic articles and 
presentations at major HIV conferences: for example, ACHAP recently compiled abstracts from 46 
presentations at major conferences between 2002 and 2012128. However, there was limited investment in 
translating these lessons into practical tools for other practitioners.  
“Platforms like ACHAP were, and still are, the best 
laboratories for bringing clarity to the field of 
health. As a field, we simply haven't done as much 
implementation research as we should have. This 
weakness has limited our ability to understand and 
learn from our experiences.” 
‐ Ambassador Eric Goosby, Former United 
States Global AIDS 
“We’ve had M&E people, but there hasn’t been the 
technical or scientific knowledge of M&E. It was just 
about collection of basic data and doing basic analysis. 
It was not informing the programs in an effective 
way” 
‐ ACHAP staff  
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ACHAP did help inform some other programs in the field. Some stakeholders do point to the less formal 
connections that ACHAP-affiliated experts were able to develop with others designing or implementing 
HIV programs, and saw these informal exchanges as valuable in sharing lessons. When the Gates 
Foundation set up Avahan in India in 2003, it reviewed early lessons from ACHAP and ultimately decided 
to use a different organizational structure. First, Avahan was established as a private entity to provide 
proof-of-concept, and only once the program had achieved a level of scale was the government engaged 
to set up a public-private partnership
129
. 
While the board emphasized advocacy and communication more in recent years and encouraged ACHAP 
to hire staff with these skill sets, they did not play a very active role in holding ACHAP accountable for 
proactive outreach
130
. In an encouraging shift, ACHAP is now investing in research to share some of its 
recent innovations with the field, including an evaluation of its demand generation approaches that 
compares the effectiveness of engagement with CBOs to ACHAP’s direct management of the 
performance-based mobilizer program. ACHAP has also commissioned modeling work on the economic 
benefits of the partnership over its 15 years, and is investing in qualitative and quantitative research on 
community TB care approaches in nine districts
131
. 
 
Plan for Sustainability 
Summary of ACHAP’s performance: In some aspects, ACHAP set its program activities on 
a clear path toward sustainability: for example, the scaling of the treatment program was 
designed with government uptake in mind. There are, however, recent areas of concern in terms 
of how elements of ACHAP’s successful programs will be sustained in the future. More broadly, 
ACHAP and its funders did not sufficiently plan for the long-term sustainability of the partnership. 
Regardless of the intended direction (for example, sunsetting, or continuing to catalyze new areas 
in the HIV response or other health issues), the partnership needed more concerted planning 
around goals for impact, accompanying milestones, and resource implications of these goals.  
ACHAP incorporated from the outset a focus on building public sector capacity and 
promoting government ownership of the ARV treatment program, though, recent 
changes have left some areas of concern.  
ACHAP supported the government in developing the National Strategic Framework 2003-2009 and 
aligned its programs to support these goals
132
. The process for developing the National Strategic 
Framework was highly collaborative, engaging both community and national level leadership over an 18 
month period to develop the plan. The approach of working closely with the government to design 
strategies and support implementation required a commitment on both the side of ACHAP and the 
Government of Botswana to deliver results and support the long-term sustainability of HIV/AIDS 
programs.  
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Though funding flexibility and ACHAP’s contribution of resources were critical to the initial, successful 
scale up of the ARV treatment program, ACHAP was slow to shift to a longer term plan for cost effective 
program execution and long-term financial sustainability for the programs it established. As the model 
required government engagement and ultimately government support for uptake of the treatment 
program, it was critical for ACHAP to be conscious of cost-effectiveness for long-term sustainability. As 
mentioned previously, the program’s cost effectiveness was a concern for the Government of Botswana 
in its early days, but given the immediacy of the need and entrepreneurial nature of the effort, cost 
remained a secondary priority. 
While ACHAP’s program was staffed by government health workers and interfaced with government 
systems, its operations were in a silo with respect to broader health service delivery, making integration 
more challenging and expensive. Consequently, the full transition of the ARV treatment program did not 
take place until September 2012. After ACHAP fully transferred responsibilities to the government, 
170,860 (85 percent) out of 201,822 patients were receiving treatment from the public sector
133
. ACHAP 
continued to provide support through the treatment optimization pilot and the ARV drug donations from 
Merck, who donated $25M worth of ARV drugs in 2012
134
.  
The KITSO health worker training initiative was one of the most challenging treatment-related programs 
to transfer. The Ministry of Health was delayed in developing a sustainability plan, and in the end did not 
commit to providing the same level of the human and financial resources as ACHAP, so PEPFAR 
provided funds to the MOH to revive and coordinate the program. The Botswana-Harvard Partnership 
continues to support content development for KITSO. 
There are concerns about the government’s ability to 
continue funding the ARV treatment program in 
perpetuity given recent budgetary issues in the public 
sector and the relatively high costs of the program. 
This is especially a concern in an environment where 
other international donors, such as PEPFAR, are also 
transitioning out of Botswana and looking to the 
government to take over its current programming work. 
PEPFAR is planning to decrease annual funding in 
Botswana from $75M to $35M by 2016 and then a continued $10M reduction per year after that
135
. A 
report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that stakeholders in Botswana 
are concerned that a “hasty or inflexible scale-down of PEPFAR funding in Botswana will… put at risk 
many of the gains made during the last decade in HIV treatment and PMTCT
136
.”  
Broadly speaking, ACHAP’s board struggled to hold the partnership to milestones 
for transferring financial and non-financial responsibilities to the government and 
other implementing partners, making it challenging for the board to hold ACHAP 
management accountable for successful transfer and wind down of programs. 
Planning for the sustainability of ACHAP as an entity was brought up by ACHAP’s management and 
discussed by the board as early as 2003, but the funders and board put minimal emphasis on the issue at 
“Their funding of KITSO was great, and its legacy is very 
strong, but it wasn’t integrated into the health system in 
terms of delivering other forms of care. KITSO would 
have been a great initial way of strengthening 
Botswana’s greater health system – you could have 
latched on other forms of health training to it.”  
- Government of Botswana official 
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the time. According to the key stakeholders involved, ACHAP was originally established with a five year 
time horizon. It was intended to catalyze the national response, and then be fully transferred to 
government or other stakeholders inside the country
137
. 
In late 2004, the board began reviewing plans and budgets for ACHAP’s continued programs for 2005-
2009. The board supported continued funding for ongoing projects through 2005, with the understanding 
that ACHAP would simultaneously develop a refocused strategy for new programs. During this period, 
ACHAP’s board became more involved in overseeing daily management of the organization to ensure the 
continued success of existing programs as well as to support the design and launch of new strategies 
such as district-level engagement. As a consequence, the board spent less time focused on planning for 
the future of the organization. 
Board representatives from the respective funders did not 
always communicate and coordinate effectively with one 
another (at a board level, or with their respective 
headquarters), which further complicated the future planning 
for ACHAP’s sustainability. Thus, as funders reached the end 
of the first funding commitment in 2009, they still felt that there 
was a need to ensure the sustainability of the programs they had invested in to date, and to leverage the 
platform that had been built for further impact. The board also felt that more needed to be done in HIV 
prevention in Botswana and ACHAP should focus more on efforts in this area
138
. 
ACHAP’s management also had responsibility to drive strategic planning for the organization and lead 
planning efforts for future sustainability. However, these functions were deprioritized, and initially the 
management did not follow through on its role to engage the board in planning needed to wind down 
funding or transition to new sources. The departure of the Gates Foundation greatly affected the 
organization. Before that point, stakeholders involved mentioned an implicit belief that ACHAP would 
continue to receive funding from its two original funders. With the departure of the Gates Foundation, 
ACHAP’s management and staff were under a new pressure to deliver results and think more 
strategically about the future of the organization. However, as the 2014 conclusion of the Merck 
Foundation’s funding neared, ACHAP management was somewhat slow to begin planning for the 
organization’s future identity and business model. ACHAP’s initial 2013 budget did not include a business 
development function; however, with input from the board, this was adjusted to become a major area of 
emphasis for the organization. The Government of Botswana faced a similar slow start in planning for the 
transition: while Merck had communicated that the ARV donations would conclude at the end of 2014 and 
provided guidance to the Government on a phase-down approach, by late 2013 the government had not 
developed detailed forecasting of the ARV need and any potential gaps in support
139
. 
 
 
“Sustainability was never tackled early on 
because it was never an urgent issue.”  
- Linda Distlerath, Former ACHAP board 
member 
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Lessons for Other Public-Private Partnerships 
Based on the successes and challenges during ACHAP’s 15 years of partnership, there are six key 
lessons that other public-private partnerships should incorporate into their work.  
1. Emphasize adaptation as a core characteristic for successful public-private 
partnerships: Partnerships looking to maintain relevance and impact in a dynamic context 
need to adapt at strategic, organizational, and programmatic levels. Several attributes can lay a 
foundation for public-private partnerships to adapt successfully: 
a. Emphasize nimble execution: Hire staff and management that take initiative, are 
results-driven, and move at a rapid pace to help the partnership to be reactive to the 
changing context. At the same time, be sure to identify opportunities to embed the private 
sector skills in government processes and culture.  
b. Leverage flexible funding: In the beginning, partnerships should prioritize a flexible 
funding structure to allow for management to establish programs and test new practices 
to identify the appropriate path for reaching the partnership’s goal. Once these visions 
and strategies are established, partnerships can shift to alternate funding structures that 
tie short-term results more closely to future funding decisions.  
c. Embed learning mechanisms early: Build relationships and take time to incorporate 
new data into planning early and often to identify new science, emerging partnership 
opportunities, and changing needs.  
  
2. Be intentional about strategic shifts and set a clear upfront strategy and 
milestones: Partnerships can allow for flexibility early in the process to encourage 
entrepreneurial activity and innovation. However, all activities should be tied to clear goals and 
once the initial programs are established, the partnership should create a clear strategic plan with 
milestones and systems for measuring progress. The plan should assess the internal staff 
expertise and capabilities to evaluate if the partnership can execute on the plan and identify any 
additional skills needed. The partnership should focus on hiring the right staff and building 
strategic partnerships that will help with execution against the plan. The milestones can also 
provide decision points for the partnership to assess whether or not to continue funding individual 
programs. 
3. Design the appropriate governance and management structure: Public-private 
partnerships should assess the expertise and guidance needed to execute the chosen strategy. 
For example, organizations can select a management team with private sector expertise and 
balance this with public sector or content expertise on the board. Alternately, partnerships place 
funders on the board to maintain close relationships between the funders and the grantee. Either 
way, the partnership should be clear about the implications of the governance and management 
structures that it creates to anticipate opportunities or challenges. 
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4. Plan for sustainability and ensure there is ongoing communication between 
members of the partnership at the execution and leadership levels: It is critical 
that partners begin with the end in mind to ensure that progress will be sustained. Partners need 
to plan for the sustainability of programs upfront during the program design phase, and discuss 
potential exit strategies for the organization’s initial funders. Partners engaged in the initiative 
need to communicate about the partnership strategy and ensure alignment on program goals. In 
addition, partners should communicate at the leadership level to ensure the strategic directions of 
the participating organizations also align.  
5. Develop capabilities in learning and evaluation as well as implementation 
research: Public-private partnerships need a mix of internal capacity development and external 
support in order to strengthen their abilities to collect and interpret data in a useful way and inform 
their own organizational planning as well as for the broader field. Partnerships also need to be 
intentional about their plans for disseminating best practices to the field by emphasizing relevant 
implementation research that responds to needs of other program managers, and by using 
diverse venues and practical formats beyond annual reports and academic publications.  
 
6. Align the degree of government collaboration with the partnership 
objectives and build appropriate structures for coordination: Partnerships need 
to design appropriate collaboration mechanisms that allow for alignment with government in order 
for partners to effectively execute and scale programs. How these collaboration mechanisms 
operate more specifically will depend on the partnership’s objectives, resources available, 
government capabilities, and support needed to achieve the goals. There is a range of structures 
for collaboration: partners can engage with government by infusing private resources directly into 
government budgets, by forming hybrid collaborations such as ACHAP, or by launching private 
sector-led efforts that operate with light oversight from and coordination with government. Some 
may require less intensive relationships with a lighter coordinating forum, while others may 
require a deeper collaboration with support across all levels of government.  
 
 
 
The Future of ACHAP 
Adapting through Crisis: Lessons from ACHAP's Contributions to the Fight against HIV/AIDS in Botswana 
 
65 
The Future of ACHAP 
ACHAP is now at a turning point. After 15 years, it is seeking to expand beyond its original legacy 
funders, with the conclusion of the Gates Foundation and Merck Foundation support in 2012 and 2014, 
respectively. During 2013, the organization has refreshed its strategy and business plan, and is actively 
engaged in discussions around future funding for the organization, transition of supported programs, and 
planning for new opportunities for impact.  
The context for this new vision of ACHAP is at once both exciting and challenging. Several trends in 
global health create opportunities for ACHAP: for example, a broader recognition of the role of the private 
sector in catalyzing government responses and an increased emphasis on solidifying gains made through 
vertical HIV-specific programming while also shifting to broader health systems strengthening. Donors, 
such as USAID through its USAID Forward initiative
ix
, are also looking to shift implementation of projects 
to create more country ownership and local integration.  
More challenging trends include the decreased funding for HIV-specific programming, lower availability of 
donor resources for middle-income countries such as Botswana, and a highly competitive landscape of 
global health implementing organizations, most of whom have well-established relationships with key 
donors as well as with country governments. As shown previously in Figure 8, Botswana has the highest 
domestic HIV funding per capita in the region and the government is already contributing significant 
resources towards HIV programming costs and thus is likely in a better position than its neighboring 
countries to take on additional funding needs in the future. There are still reasons for concern about the 
future of the AIDS response in Botswana, 
such as the ability of the country to contain 
costs, retain health professionals, and 
maintain gains in health planning and 
management
140
. Furthermore, younger 
populations with high incidence rates were 
not witness to the initial HIV/AIDS crisis of 
the 1990s and could continue to engage in 
risky behavior, also contributing to a reversal 
in progress. 
In this context, the ACHAP strategic plan beyond 2014 brings both a longer-term vision and more 
immediate practicality. Ultimately, ACHAP wants to expand throughout Southern Africa, using a franchise 
model of partnership with local NGOs, as well as continuing to operate in Botswana. Its service offerings 
will include existing work (HIV-focused, with an emphasis on scaling treatment and SMC), and also 
                                                     
ix USAID Forward is a reform agenda focused on supporting local institutions to deliver measurable results, investing in 
innovative solutions with potential to scale, and making current investments more effective (USAID.gov). 
“Integration and health systems strengthening are where 
they should be focusing – they did well with HIV 1.0, but 
this is HIV 2.0. Now, the key issues are around supply chain, 
infrastructure, and quality of care. HIV has the biggest national 
infrastructure, and ACHAP needs to facilitate the transition  
of this infrastructure into broader health system 
improvements.” 
- Government of Botswana official 
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building new areas of expertise such as non-communicable diseases. In the near term, ACHAP’s 
leadership is pursuing several more immediate opportunities; in mid-2014 it was selected as the private 
sector principal recipient for Botswana’s Global Fund TB/HIV Concept Note. 
As ACHAP considers its future positioning, it should reflect on its history of adaptation and how those 
shifts apply to future strategy. The skills and role of ACHAP today are different from previous incarnations 
of the partnership, and the ACHAP management and board will need to clearly articulate a unique value 
proposition that is both grounded in the current expertise of the organization, and appealing to potential 
funders and partners in new markets.  
ACHAP also needs to determine how to preserve its adaptive nature when broadening across multiple 
markets and engaging with donors who may view service implementation in a more transactional manner. 
To preserve the adaptive spirit that is an essential element of the ACHAP model, the organization should 
prioritize strategic learning and evaluation, and build governance mechanisms that allow for more 
proactive planning around shifts in overall strategy and role. 
From reflecting on ACHAP’s past and future, stakeholders have raised several high-potential areas for 
ACHAP or an ACHAP-like model to play a role. These include: acting as a national proof of concept for a 
test-and-treat policy in a high-burden country, focusing on the process of mainstreaming HIV care into 
broader health systems, and catalyzing non-communicable disease treatment.  
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Conclusion 
ACHAP broke new ground in proving the feasibility of HIV treatment in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
successes of Botswana emboldened the global AIDS response, shifting the dialogue to emphasize 
aggressive targets for treatment scale-up. Despite working in a rapidly changing context, ACHAP had 
substantial impact, expanding access to treatment, achieving scale in safe male circumcision, and 
strengthening the health system of Botswana. In these major programs, the partnership was able to 
adjust its approaches to implementation and play a flexible role alongside the government. In others 
areas, though, it was unable to achieve the same level of impact:  
ACHAP’s partnership model served as an example for other funders to follow. The partnership provides 
crucial lessons for other public-private initiatives, particularly in how it was able to adapt its strategy and 
role beyond the initial mandate, and in its early structures for engaging government. However, ACHAP 
also offers several cautionary tales for other public-private partnerships. It underinvested in evaluation, 
insufficiently navigated the changing political context in Botswana, and belatedly planned for the 
sustainability of the partnership.  
In the future, there are tremendous opportunities for ACHAP and other partnerships to take these lessons 
into new arenas: for example, in the mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS services into the broader public health 
system, and in the response to the emerging burden of non-communicable disease in low- and middle-
income countries. Hopefully, these future efforts will retain and strengthen the adaptive nature that 
ACHAP has displayed over its 15 years of impact on HIV/AIDS in Botswana. 
 
 
  
Appendix A 
          :  
Adapting through Crisis: Lessons from ACHAP's Contributions to the Fight against HIV/AIDS in Botswana 68 
Appendix A 
List of Key Informant Interviews 
 
Current ACHAP Staff 
Name Affiliation 
1.  Benjamin Binagwa 
Lead Technical Advisor, SMC Program 
2. Nick Brealy 
Director, Business Development 
3. Lesego Busang 
Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist 
4. Juliana Cuervo-Rojas 
Director, Monitoring, Evaluation and Research 
5. Rachel Jackson 
Grants Manager 
6. Christopher Lekobane 
Senior Finance Officer 
7. Dr. Jerome Mafeni 
Chief Executive Officer 
8. Mmama Mhlanga-Fichani 
Human Resources Manager 
9. Kabo Monare 
Senior Communication and Advocacy Officer 
10. Blessed Monyatsi 
Regional Manager, North 
11. Elizabeth Moshi 
Regional Manager, South 
12. Dr. Kenneth Mugisha 
Project Coordinator, Treatment Optimization 
13. Dr. Frank Mwangemi 
Executive Officer, Programs 
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Former ACHAP Staff 
Name Affiliation 
14. Dr. Ernest Darkoh-
Ampem 
Former Manager, MASA Program 
Founding Partner, BroadReach Healthcare 
15. Dr. Donald De Korte Former Managing Director 
Head, Southern Africa Country Group, Novartis 
16. Leonard Manthe Former Manager, ARV & Infrastructure 
Deputy Director, Tebelopele 
17. Dr. Themba Moeti Former Chief Executive Officer  
Chief Executive Officer, Health Systems Trust 
18. Art Mooney Former Chief Operations Officer 
 
Current ACHAP Board and Funders 
Name Affiliation 
19. Brenda Colatrella Executive Director, Office of Corporate Responsibility, Merck  
Current ACHAP board member 
20. Chirfi Guindo General Manager & Global Commercial Lead, HIV, Merck  
21. Dr. Mark Feinberg Vice President, Medical Affairs and Policy, Merck  
Current ACHAP board member 
22. Leslie Hardy Vice President, Merck Foundation 
23. Dr. Richard Marlink Executive Director, Harvard School of Public Health 
Current ACHAP board member 
24. Joy Phumaphi Executive Secretary, African Leaders Malaria Alliance 
Current ACHAP board chair 
25. Alinah Segobye Deputy Executive Director, Human Sciences Research Council  
Current ACHAP board member 
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Former ACHAP Board and Funders 
Name Affiliation 
26. Dr. Stefano Bertozzi Former Director, HIV Program, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
Dean, School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley 
27. Carmine Bozzi Former Deputy Director, HIV Program, Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation 
Senior Partner, Akeso Associates  
Former ACHAP board member 
28. Linda Distlerath Former Vice President, Global Health Policy, Merck  
Deputy Vice President, International Alliance Development, 
PhRMA 
Former ACHAP board member 
29. Dr. Helene Gayle Former Director, HIV, TB, and Reproductive Health Program, Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation 
President and Chief Executive Officer, CARE  
Former ACHAP board member 
30. David Harrison Chief Executive Officer, DG Murray Trust 
Former ACHAP board member 
31. Dr. Luke Nkinsi Former Senior Program Officer, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
Project Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Foundation  
Former ACHAP board chair 
32. Guy Macdonald Former Vice President, Hospital and Anti-Infective Products, 
Merck 
Chief Executive Officer, Tetraphase Pharma 
Former ACHAP board member 
33. Owen Ryan Former Program Officer, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
Vice President, The Corkery Group 
34. Jeffrey Sturchio Former Vice President, Corporate Responsibility, Merck 
President and CEO, Rabin Martin 
Former ACHAP board member 
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Global Health Experts 
Name Affiliation 
35. Christoph Benn External Relations Director, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria 
36. Doug Call Vice President & Senior Regional Director, Population Services 
International 
37. Dr. Alex Coutinho Executive Director, Infectious Disease Institute 
38. John Damonti President, Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation 
39. Dr. Eric Goosby Former US Global AIDS Coordinator 
40. Robert Hecht Managing Director, Results for Development 
41. Dr. Krishna Jafa Vice President, Sexual and Reproductive Health and TB, 
Population Services International 
42. Dr. Michael Johnson Global Fund Attaché to the Permanent Mission of the USA 
43. Dr. Peter Kilmarx Country Director (Zimbabwe), Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention 
44. Dr. Michael Merson Founding Director, Duke Global Health Institute 
45. Phangisile Mtshali  Director, Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation 
46. Mbulawa Mugabe Director, Country Impact and Sustainability, UNAIDS 
47. Dr. Eugene Nyarko Former Country Representative for Botswana, World Health 
Organization 
48. Kanchan Reed Country Coordinator (Botswana), The President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)  
49. Jeff Richardson Vice President, AbbVie Foundation 
50. Beth Skorochod Senior Technical Advisor, Population Services International 
51. Noah Taruberekera Regional Researcher, Southern Africa, Population Services 
International 
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52. Dr. Kathleen Toomey Country Director (Botswana), Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention 
53. Mitchell Warren Executive Director, AVAC 
 
Government of Botswana 
Name Affiliation 
54. Ikwatlhaeng Bagopi Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Labour 
55. Muhammad Farooq 
Chohan 
Manager, Central Medical Stores 
56. Wililani Goitsemang District AIDS Coordinator, Serowe District 
57. Dr. Banu Khan Former Director, National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA) 
58. Dr. Refeletswe 
Lebelonyane 
Director, Combination Therapy, Ministry of Health 
59. Steven Ludick Director, Ministry of Local Government 
60. Nkotula Majingo Principal Health Officer, Ministry of Health 
61. Dr. Kolaatamo Malefo Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health 
62. Mokgadi Mantswe District AIDS Coordinator, Serowe District 
63. Dr. Kereng Masupu Former Epidemiologist, National AIDS Coordinating Agency 
(NACA) 
Secretariat, The Champions for an HIV-Free Generation 
64. Richard Matlhare Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education 
65. Halakangwa Mbulai Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government & 
Rural Development 
66. Grace Muzila Coordinator, National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA) 
67. Dr. Ndwapi Ndwapi Director, Ministerial Strategy Office, Ministry of Health 
68. Dinah Ramaabya Principal Health Officer, Ministry of Health  
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69. Solomon Sekwakwa Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance & Development 
Planning 
70. Segakweng Tsiane Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defense, Justice and Security 
 
Other Botswana Key Informants 
Name Affiliation 
71. Bashi Gaetsaloe Country Manager, Accenture Botswana 
72. Irene Kwape National Coordinator, Botswana Christian AIDS Intervention 
Programme (BOCAIP) 
73. Dr. Joseph Makhema Chief Executive Officer, Botswana-Harvard Partnership 
74. Batho Christopher 
Molomo 
Executive Secretary, The Champions for an HIV-Free Generation 
75. Oratile Morongwane Managing Director, ExceQ Services 
76. Daniel Motsatsing Former Director, Botswana Network of AIDS Service 
Organizations (BONASO) 
77. Dr. Oatlhokwa 
Nkomazanao 
Associate Dean, School of Medicine, Univ. of Botswana 
78. Vuyi Otukile Director, Youth Health Organization (YOHO) 
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Appendix B 
Additional Figures 
 
Figure 20: Comparison of ACHAP to other major health public-private partnerships 
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Figure 21: Evolution of ACHAP’s board of directors 
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